

サイ。レーンボウ第一號ノ日附何時トナツテイマスカ
デエロー大將 レーンボウ第一號ハ八月十四日海軍長官代理ニヨリ承認セ
シタモノデス。

副議長

八月十四日トハ何年ノデスカ

デエロー大將 一九三九年ハ昭和十四年ノデス。一九三九年ハ昭和十四年ノ
八月十四日陸軍長官代理ニヨツテデス。此書類「二六四二」ハ私が戦争計畫
部ニ配屬セラルル前ニ出來テ居リマシタ。

デエロー大將 ソレハ分ツテオリマシタ。戦争計畫部一員トシテノ貴方ニ求
メタルハ其ノ計畫案ハ何チショウトシタモノカ、又ソレト一九三八年ハ
昭和十三年ノオランダトノ關係ハドウデアツタカニツイテ本委員會ニタ
提議的ニオ話しテ下サルコトデセウ。

デエロー大將 ハイ

此計畫ノ根據トスル一般的状态ハ此ノ指令ガ發セラレタ當時歐洲大戦ガ進行
中デ、他ノ諸國ヲ引キ入レソノ爲軍事行動ノ舞ヲ擴メル可能性ガアツタノ
デアリマス。

合衆國が今直グニモ此戦争ニ引キズリ込マレル可能性が絶エズ存在シテ居ル。又歐洲ノ平和ハ、合衆國ガモンロー主義ト太平洋ニ於ケル我が權益保全ノ爲メニ聯合國トハ離レテ防禦シナクレバナクナルダウトイフ状態ヲ伴フ可能性ガアル。

ミツチエル氏 其ノ計畫案ハ大西洋及太平洋ノ作戦行動ニモ亘ツテ居リマスカ

デエロー大將 ハイ ソウデアリマス

ミツチエル氏 同案ハ萬一ノ對日戦ヲモ假想シテ居マスカ

デエロー大將 ハイ ソウデアリマス。私ハ其ノ根據トシル特別状態ニ就

テ朗讀致シタイト存ジマス。

ハ二六四三ミデエル氏 ヨロシイ

デエロー大將 レンボウ第一號ニ關スル特別情勢ハ一朗讀

歐羅巴ニ於ル戦争ノ終結ニ續イテ獨逸及伊太利ニヨリ南亞米利加ニ於テモンロー主義ノ條文又ハ精神ガ冒瀆サレテイル。コレニ加フルニ極東ニ於ケル合衆國ノ權益ニ對シ日本ノ武力侵略ガ行ハレテイル。其他ノ諸國

ハ中立デアル。

本案ノ目的ハ敵ノ目的特ニ西半球ノ凡ソ南緯十三度以北ノ領土及水域上ノ敵目的ヲ打破ルガ爲メ海陸軍兵力ヲ最モ效果的ニ使用スル様準備スルニアツタ。本計畫ハ先ヅ最初ニ合衆國兵力ノ行使ヲ米兩大陸ト
↓南緯十三度以北ノ大陸周邊ノ諸島並ニウリラスカ及ミツドウェーを
含ム西太平洋ニ於ケル合衆國領土ニ限ル。本計畫ハ其後ノ西太平洋ニ對スル合衆國支配權ノ擴大ハ西半球ニ於ル合衆國ノ軍事目的完成ト相俟ツテ出來ル丈ケ急速ニ具体化スル、然シ乍ラ斯ル作戰行動ノ擴大ノ如キ計畫ハ目下出來テ居ナイ。

ミツチエール氏　デハ共同陸海軍基本戦争計畫中ノ第三ノ項目レインボウ
第五號ニ進ンデ下サイ。先ズ（二六四四）御覽ニナツテソノ日附トソノ
案ノ範圍ハ正確ニドンナモノデアアルカ或ハ又ドンナモノデアツタカヲ簡
單ニ話シテ下サイ。

デエロ！大將　此ノ計畫案ハ一九四一年（昭和十六年）十一月十九日參
謀總長ト海軍作戰部長ニヨツテ承認セラレマシタ。

私ハ本案ノ其ノ基礎トナツテ居ル一般的假説ヲ朗讀スレバ本案ノ如何ナ
ルモノデアアルカバ一番ヨク解ルト思ヒマス、即チ

當初合衆國、英國聯邦（エールヲ除ク）支那及「自由佛蘭西」ヨリ
成ル聯合國ハ

イ、獨逸、伊太利、ルーマニヤ、ハンガリー、ブルガリヤ、或ハ
ロ、獨逸、伊太利、日本、ルーマニヤ、ハンガリー、ブルガリヤ
印度支那、泰國

ヨリ成ル樞軸諸國ト交戦中ナルヨト。

聯合國ハ▲ボロー一及▲ボロー二ニ隨ヒ戰ヲ行フコト。

假令日本、印度支那及泰國ハ當初戰爭ニ加ハラザリシニモセヨ、之等諸國介入ノ可能性ヲ考慮ニ入レザルベカラザルコト。

極東ヲ根據トスベキ合衆國軍ハ人員彈藥、技術的原料以外ノ軍事上ノ必需品ハソノ總地區ニ於ケル資源ヨリ充當シ得ラルベキコト。

拉丁アメリカ共和國諸國ハ（二六四五）破壊的分子取締ノ手段ヲ講スルコト、但シ直接攻撃ヲ受ルニ至ルニ非レバ非交戰國狀態ヲ存續スルコト、大体ニ於テ是等共和國諸國領海及國土ノ根據地ハ半球防衛ノ目的ヲ以テ合衆國軍ノ使用ニ供セラルベキコト

以上ハ本計畫案ノ根據セル假說デアリマス。

ミツチエル氏　デハ次ノ項目、陸軍省作戰計畫案ーレーンボウ第五號ニ移リマセウ。アレハ何デスカ。

デエロー大將　陸海軍共同基本戰爭計畫案ガ出來マシテカラ一軍ト海軍トハ共同計畫ヲ基礎トシテ各自別々ニ夫々ノ計畫ヲ建テマシタ。

此ノ昭和十六年ノ陸軍省作戰計畫、レーンボウ第五編ハ陸海軍共同基本
計畫ーレーンボウ第五編ヲ基トシテ拵ヘタ陸軍省案デアリマス。此ノ中
ニハ基本計畫ノ中ニアルモノガ澤山アリマス。即チ戦争ノ概念、戦争遂
行ノ場合ノ諸假説、兵力配分ノ方法、下位指揮官ニ夫々從屬的計畫ヲ立
案セシムル指令、政府内他ノ各省トノ間ニ保持セザルベカラザル統制ヲ
含ムデ居リマス。

辯護圖書第一五〇〇號一五〇四

ミツチエル氏「布哇諸島地域ハ其ノ範圍ノ中ニ含まレルノデセウカ」
デエロー中將「ソウデス、含まレテオリマス」

(二六四六)

ミツチエル氏「貴官ハ其ノ日附ヲ申シマシタカ」

デエロー中將「此ノ書類ハ承認ノ日附カ書イテアリマセン 然シ私ハ
ソレハ確カニ一九四一年（昭和十六年）八月中デアッタト思イマス」
ミツチエル氏「書證第四四號ニハ「一九四一年（昭和十六年）八月、

參謀長ニ依リ承認サルト記入シテアリマス」

デエロー中將「成ル程ソウデス、私ノ書類ノ中ノ何處カニソノ控ヘガ
アルト思ヒマス」

ミツチエル氏「心配シナイデヨロシイ 大体其ノ邊デシヨウ」

デエロー中將「其レハ確ニ一九四一年（昭和十六年）八月ニ布哇ニ同
ケテ發送サレタモノデス、ソシテ其ノ受領書ハ一九四一年（昭和十

六年）九月三日ニ陸軍省カラ轉送サレテ受ケ取ツテオリマス」

ミツチエル氏「次ニ御聞キシタイ事ハ一九四〇年（昭和十五年）改正ノ布陸防衛計畫ニ關スル拔萃デス。貴官ハ其レヲ御覽ニナツテ其ノ警類ノ範圍ト性質、ソレカラ其ノ日附ヲ言ツテ下サイ」

ヂエロー中將「ハイ。此ノ警類ハ最初布陸ニ於イテ作製サレマシタル唯今私が甲上ゲマシタ所ノ陸軍省案ニ基イテ作ツターツノ地方案デアリマス」

ミツチエル氏「一九四〇年（昭和十五年）ニ地方勤務ノ司令官ニ依ツテ作製サレター案デスカ？」

ヂエロー中將「ソウデアリマス」

ミツチエル氏「布陸管轄區ノ司令將校ニ依ツテ作製サレタノデスカ」（二六四七）

ヂエロー中將「布陸管轄區ノ司令將官ニ依ツテ作製サレタノデアリマス」

ミツチエル氏「ソレデハ、第十四海軍地區ノ司令官トイフ譯デスカ」

デエロー中將「違イマス。コレハ陸海共同案デアリマセン。コレハ陸軍案デアリマス。コレハ案トハ少々違イマス。小官等ハソレヲ防衛構案ト呼ンデ居リマス」

ミツチエル氏「ワカリマシタ」

デエロー中將「ソレハ完遂スベキ一ツノ目的ヲ含ンデ居リマス。ガ主トシテ第一ニ相當ニ詳細ニ亘リ戦争使命ヲ遂行スルタメ方法手段ヲ講ズル様ニ指令サレテ居リマス」

議長「一寸デエロー將軍ニオタヅネシマス。貴官ハ、コレハ一九四〇年ニ作製サレ又唯今貴官ガ甲立テラレタバカリノ前項ニ基イテオルト言ワレルノデスガ前項ハ一九四一年（昭和十五年）八月ニ確認サレタ様ニ思ハレマス。コノ二ツノ年月ニ就イテハ何カ相違ガアルノデハナイノデスカ」

デエロー中將「此ノ防衛構案ハ一年一回作製セラレ、ソシテ一年一回改正サレルノデアリマス。コレハ一九四〇年（昭和十五年）度版デアリマス。一九四一年（昭和十五年）度版ハ其ノ當時ハマダ完成サレマセシタガ、一九三八年度ノ、オレンジ案及ビレインボ案第一號ニハ

布哇ノタメノ戦争使命が含まレテ居リマシタルソシテ是等ノ計畫案ハ其ノ當時存在セル防衛構案ヲ改正スベキ他ノ資料ト一所ニ採用サレタノデアリマス

ミツチエル氏「其ノ次ニ御聞ヤシタイ事ハ布哇ノ共同海岸地畵（二六四八）防衛計畫案デアリマスガ、其レハ何デスカ？」

デエロー中將「コレハ布哇陸軍及ビ海軍ノ地方司令官ニ依ツテ作製セラレタ共同計畫デ陸軍省ニ依ツテハエラレタ陸海軍共同計畫ニ基イタモノデアリマス」

ミツチエル氏「其ノ日附ハイツデスカ？」

デエロー中將「此ノ書類ハ一九四一年（昭和十六年）四月十一日ニ布哇管轄區司令部ニ依ツテ承認セラレ且ツ一九四一年（昭和十六年）四月十一日ニ第十四海軍管區司令部ニ依ツテ承認サレタノデアリマス」

ミツチエル氏「其ノ書類ハ書類第四十四號中ニアリマシテ其ノ單ナル抜萃デハナクテ、全文デアルトイフコトヲ私ハ申上げマス」全部

ガ此ノ警燈第四十四號ノ中ニ收メラレテ居リマス。

次ノ事項ハ布告ノ共同海岸地區防衛計畫案、附録第七號中第七號デア
リマス。ソシテ其ノ日附ハイツデスカ、ソレハ如何ナルモノデスカ
デエロー四將一其ノ質問ヲモウ一度繰リ返シテ言ツテ下サイマセンカ
ミツナエル比「次ノ事項ハ布告ノ共同海岸地區防衛計畫案ノ附録第七號
デアリマス。其ノ書類ハ如何ナルモノカ、ソノ性質、及び其ノ日附ハ
イツデスカ」

デエロー中將「附録第七號ニ對シマシテハ第十四海軍管區司令部ト布告
管轄區司令部トニ依リ作製サレターツノ地方案ガ附イテオリマス。
其ノ日附ハ一九四一年（昭和十六年）三月二十八日デアリマス。ソシ
テソレハ共同安全万策ト艦隊及ビ眞珠灣基地ノ保護トニ關スルモノデ
アリマス。」

機密圖書證第一五〇〇號K四

(二六四九)ミツチエル氏、同じ第八卷中ニアル次ノ事項ハ

ハワイニ於ケル共同空軍隊算デアル

(マーテンーベリンガー協定)。

ソレハ何レノ證據デアリマスカ。

デセル氏 第四十四號デス。

ミツチエル氏 アナタハ「ハワイ」ニ於ケル空軍情勢ニ關ス

ル研究ト題スル一九四一年(昭和十六年)八月廿日付ノ報告ヲ見
タ事ガアリマシタカ。

キーフ氏 ソレハイツノ日付デスカ。

ミツチエル氏 一九四一年(昭和十六年)八月廿日デス、ソレ
ハ「ハワイ」ニ於ケル空軍情勢ノ研究ト題シ、ハワイ州、シヤフ
ター要務、ハワイ部隊司令官ヲ通ジテ「ワシントン」海軍空軍司令
官宛ニ送付サレタモノデ前ニ證據證第一十三號ト記載サレタモノデ
アリマス。アナタハ其報告書ヲ讀テ見タ事ガアリマスカ。

デエロー中尉 其報告書ヲ見タムニ今思ヒ起ス事ガ出来マセン。
ミツチエル氏 航空母艦ガソレニ類スルモノカラ攻撃サレタウナ時即
チ朝ノ空中攻撃ニ對スル「ハワイ」ノ脆弱性ヲ考慮シ、次ニソレヲ破壊
スル

方法及び前夜ノ中ニ日本航空母艦ヲ発見スル爲メ三百六十度景観偵
察ヲ行フニ要スル飛行機數ヲ計算シタ報告書デアリマス。

デエロー中尉 私ハ此査問會ノ區間ニ其報告書ヲ讀ミマシタ。

(二六五〇)ミツチエル氏 アナタハ其當時ハ御座ニナシナカツタノ
デスカ。

デエロー中尉 其當時見タ事ヲ思ヒ起シマセン

ミツチエル氏 日録中ノ第九節テズノ頁目ハ「一九四一年(一九四十
六年)十一月五日附ハワイ部隊常時作業順序」ニアリマス

ソレヲ閱覽ニアツテソレハ何デアルカチ私共ニ説明シテ下サイマセンカ
デエロー中尉 其書類ハ一九四一年(昭和十六年)ハワノ部隊作戦命
令ノ中ニアルモノデス、サキニ述べラレタヨウニソレハ一ツノ常時作業

順序デアリマス。

ミツチエル氏

証ニヨツテ布告セラレタモノデスカ。

デエロー中尉

ソレハ布告部司令官ニヨツテデアリマス。

ミツチエル氏

司令官自身ノ考ニニヨルモノデ、ワシントンカラノ指

令デハナカツタノデスネ

デエロー中尉

ソウデス、司令官曰身ノモノデス

ミツチエル氏

ソレハシヨート軍下將ガ強要警戒第一第二第三ヲ指

令シタ事デアリマスカ。ソレトモコノ証ハ私ノ考ニ違イデセウカ。

デエロー中尉

ソウデス、ソレ等ノ警戒ガ此ノ警報ニ合マレテオリマ

ス。

ミツチエル氏

警戒第一即チ外部カラ脅威ヲ受ケズシテ行ワレル作業

ガ事等デスカ。

デエロー中尉

ソウデス。

ミツチエル氏

ソノ警報チ一九〇一年（昭和十六年）十二月七日以前ニ見マシタカ。

デエロー中尉

十二月七日以前ニ見タ事ヲ思ヒ出シマセン。（二六五一）陸軍省記帳ニ

ヨレバソレハ一九〇一年（昭和十七年）ノ事リスニ察タモノト思ヒマス。

ミツチエル氏 第十項目ハ「戦地命令第一號」テ第十一ハ「海軍基本戰略カラノ抜萃」第十二ハ「太平洋艦隊極秘文書二〇Lノ

四一」デアリマス。

ソレ等ハ海軍ノ書類デアリ、ターナー海軍大將ノ方ガ更ニ充分ニ説明出來ルノデアリマスガ、此處デノ陳述ヲ完結スル爲ニソレヲ御覽ニナツタ上大體ドンナ性質ノモノカ説明シテ下サイマセンカ。

デエロー中將 ソレハ第十項目デアリマスカ。

ミツチエル氏 第十、第十一、第十二デス。第十ガ先ヅ第一テ即チ「ハワイ部隊戦地命令第一號 N、S (海軍防衛一デス。ソノ日付ヲ言ツテ下サイ而シテ御覽ニナツテ分見ナラソノ大體ノ性質ヲ話シテ下サイ。

ジエロー中將 第十、即チ戦地命令第一號 (海軍防衛一ハ陸軍ノ書類デアリマス。

ミツチエル氏 ソウデスカ

ジエロー中將ソウデス。而シテソレハハワイ部隊司令官ニ依ツテ發表サレタ作戰命令デアリマス。ソレハ日附ガアリマセン。ソレハ緊急ノ場合ニ施スベキ命令トシテ出タモノデス。

ミツチエル氏 第十一ハ何デスカ第十一第十二第十三 海軍ノ書類デスカ

ヂエロー中將 第十一ハ此文書ガ示スヤウニ(二六五二)「虹」第五號ヲ基礎トシタ海軍ノ書類デアリマス。

ミツチエル氏 ソレハ「虹」第五號ニ對スル書類デ海軍ノ作戰計⁶¹畫ニ相當スルモノデスカ ソレト類似ノモノデスカ

ジエロー中將 ソウデス。ソレハ陸、海軍共同基本計畫中ニアル命令ニ從ツテ作成サレタモノデアリマス

ミツチエル氏 次ノ項目ハ第十二即チ「太平洋艦隊極秘書類二〇四十一(改訂)即チ基地及ビ作戰區域ニ於ケル艦隊ノ防衛」デアリマス。ソレハイツノ日附デスカ

ジエロー中將 日附ハ一九四一年（昭和十六年）十月十四日デア
リマス

ミツチエル氏 ソレハ誰ノ發令ニヨリ又誰ノ許可ニヨツタモノデ
スカ

ジエロー中將 太平洋艦隊司令官ニヨツテ布告サレタ。其標題
ガ示シテ居マス

ミツチエル氏 第十三ノ項目ハ第十四海軍區域海軍根據地防衛軍
司令部作戰計畫第一一四一號ありき。ソレハイツノ日。テスカ
又誰ノ發令又ハ誰ノ許可ニヨルモノデスカ。

ジエロー中將 ソレハ一九四一年（昭和十六年）二月十七日附デ
而シテソレハ眞珠灣第十四海軍區域海軍根據地防衛軍司令部ニヨツ
テ發セラレタモノデス。

（「眞珠灣攻撃」第三部一〇〇一頁一〇〇七頁）

Proceedings of the Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack - Congress of the United States, Seventy-Ninth Congress, First Session.

Excerpt from testimony of Maj. Gen. Sherman Miles, United States Army - Thursday, November 29, 1945.

.

Mr. GESELL. On the other hand, the estimates in exhibit 33 were prepared not for distribution to the theaters, but for the information of the General Staff?

General MILES. Chief of Staff and his General Staff; yes, sir.

Mr. GESELL. Well, now, what were your particular functions and duties in this organization, General Miles?

General MILES. I was the head of the whole organization, Military Intelligence Division, responsible for its administration, its expansion and for its output.

In other words, I spoke for the Military Intelligence of the General Staff. A paper would normally be prepared, we will say, of the Far East estimate by the far eastern section. That would then go for revision or comment to the immediate chief of the far eastern section, the head of the intelligence branch, and from that branch to me. But I am responsible for and was responsible for the output of the division.

Mr. GESELL. Well, now, as head of the organization, of course, you had to give special emphasis to certain aspects of its activities, and I wondered whether there was any particular phase of the work of the Military Intelligence Division which (2074) you gave particular attention to.

General MILES. Normally I would say that my particular attention was devoted to our output in the way of analyzed and estimated, evaluated information which we called "Intelligence," but I also had a good many other irons in the fire.

Mr. GESELL. Now how were you organized within your division in respect to the handling of the far eastern information?

General MILES. The Far Eastern Section of the Intelligence Branch was at that time under Colonel Bratton. He received all information that we obtained on the Far East from our military attaches, our observers, from the State Department, from the Navy Department, other departments of the Government, and although it was drying up considerably, information from civilian companies or press in the Far East, together, of course, with the secret information that we were getting from the intercepts - magic.

Mr. GESELL. Now to whom was he responsible?

General MILES. He was directly responsible to the Chief of the Intelligence Branch, at that time Col. Hayes Kroner. There was, however, also within that branch a situation section under Lieutenant Colonel Betts, now brigadier general. That was in charge of information bearing on the situation in all parts of the world. I described it at that time as the heart (2075) of the Intelligence Branch. It maintained situation maps both for G-2 and for the Secretary of War. All special studies, and so forth, emanate from this particular section.

Mr. GESELL. And that section would work in close coordination, I gather from your statement, with the Far Eastern Section of the Intelligence Branch in the formulation of estimates and studies, is that correct?

General MILES. That is correct.

Mr. GESELL. Well, now, during that time you have indicated you had several sources of information. You mentioned attaches, you mentioned, I believe, the Japanese intercepts, which you referred to as "magic." What other sources were there?

Mr. GESELL. And I gather that all of these sources were sources of information which contributed data concerning the Far East?

responsible for the output of the division. But I am responsible for and was re-
far eastern section the head of the intelligence branch, and
then go for revision or comment to the immediate chief of the
of the Far East estimate by the far eastern section. That would
General Staff. A paper would normally be prepared, we will say,
In other words, I spoke for the Military Intelligence of the
also, the expansion and for its output.

I also had a good many other items in the file.
tested, evaluated information which we called "intelligence," but
tion was devoted to our output in the way of analyzed and esti-
General WILKES. Normally I would say that my particular atten-

the Intelligence Branch. It maintained attention maps both for the Intelligence Branch. I described it at that time as the best (1907) of charge of information bearing on the situation in all parts of Lieutenant Colonel Betts, who was a general. That was in the Intelligence Branch, also within a certain section under the Intelligence Branch. He was directly responsible to the Chief of Mr. DRESBACH. How to what was he responsible?

- 2 -

辯護文書一五〇〇一五

眞珠灣攻撃調査共同委員會議事録

アメリカ合衆國第七十九國會第一議會

シヤーマン。マイルス米國陸軍少將證言拔萃

一九四五年十一月二十九日 木曜日

ゲセル氏

又他方書證第三十三號に於ける判斷は作戰地域配布の目的を以つてではなく參謀本部の情報に資するために製作されたものでありますか

その通り！參謀總長及び參謀本部のために。

マイルス少將
ゲセル氏

では此の組織に於ける貴下の特殊な職責と任務は何ですか

マイルス少將

陸軍情報部全組織の長でありましてその管理、擴張及成果に關して責任を有しました。即ち私は參謀本部情報部を代表してゐたのであります。



ゲセル氏

マイルス少將

ゲセル氏

マイルス少將

樞東情況判斷の書類は通常樞東科によつて作製されました。次いでそれは訂正又は批評を受けるため樞東科の直接上官に、又情報課長に渡り、そこから私に回つて來るのでありました。然し情報の成果に對しては私が責任を有して居りますし又以前も有して居りました。

ではその組織の長として貴下は當然組織の活動の特定の方面に重點を注がれた筈であります。が、果して貴下が特別の注意を拂はれた陸軍情報部の活動の何等かの方面があつたでせうか

通常私は吾々の所謂情報即ち分析判斷評價された報導を提供することに私の重點を指向して居りました。が、その他にも中々多忙でした。

では樞東情報を取扱ふためには貴下の情報部の^中に於て如何なる關係にありましたか

情報課樞東科は當時ブラットン大佐の指揮下にありまし

ゲセル氏

マイルス少將

ゲセル氏

た。彼は吾が大使館付武官、視察者、海軍省他の省から吾
吾が樞東に關して得た凡ての情報を受けてゐました。又可
成枯渴しつゝありましたが在樞東民間會社、新聞社からの情
報並に當然傍受の設備で得た情報を彼は受けてゐたのであ
ります。

では彼は誰に對して責任を有して居ましたか。

彼が直接責任を有してゐたのは情報課長に對してです。當
時はヘイス。クローナ大佐が課長でありました。然し該課
中には現在准將當時のベット中佐指揮下の情勢科もありま
した。該課は世界各地の情勢に關する情報の責を有しまし
た。私は當時之を情報課の心臓と（二〇七五）と申してゐ
ました。該課はG I 二及び陸軍長官の兩者のために情勢圖
を有してゐました。總ての特殊な研究の類は此の特殊な課
から提出されます。

貴下の證言より推察しますに、該課は情報課樞東科と情況

マイルス少將
ゲセル氏

マイルス少將

判斷及研究作製のため緊密な連絡の下に活動して居りましたか。

その通りであります。

所で、貴下はその期間に於いて若干の情報源を有しておられたことをお話しになりました。

貴下は大使館付武官を挙げられました。又、麻術と言はれました。日本関係の傍受電報のことも申されましたがその他に何處から情報が入りましたか。

戦地に若干の観察者がおりました。支那にはマーグルノダイ將軍指揮下の使節團があつて吾々に情報を提供してゐました。又勿論ハワイ、フィリッピン部隊の參謀部には情報部があつて情報を提供してゐました。シンガポールではクリア大佐以下の特務機關とも呼び得るものの基礎を既に作つてゐました。彼に與へるべき資金は殆んどありませんでしたが、彼は少くとも板東に於ける英特務機關との提携を促

セル氏

イルス少將

進しました。吾々は勿論、特に國務省及海軍省と及その
の機関、在ワシントンにあつた陸軍武官、使節特に英人
(二〇七六)と情報交換を致しました。
而して此等情報課が樞要に關する材料を提供した情報源であ
つたと思ひますが
その通りでありました。

Excerpts from PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
(United States Government Printing Office--Washington; 1946)

Vol. II

Page 459

TESTIMONY OF SUMNER WELLES, FORMER UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE

Mr. Gesell. You were present, were you not, during the meeting in the Atlantic between President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill?

Mr. Welles. I was.

Mr. Gesell. Did you receive any information at that meeting as to any agreement or arrangement or understanding that had been arrived at, if there was any, between President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill concerning joint action of the United States and Great Britain in the Pacific?

Mr. Welles. When I left the President, since he was due to return to Washington before myself, told me that he had had a conversation, or several conversations, with Mr. Churchill with regard to the Japanese situation and the increasing dangers in the Far East; that Mr. Churchill had suggested to him that the two governments, as a means which might be of some effect, should take parallel action in issuing a warning to the government of Japan.

As I recall it, the President stated that what Mr. Churchill had suggested was that the Government of the United States should state to the Government of Japan that if Japan persisted in her policy of conquest and aggression the United States, in the protection of its legitimate interests and in order to provide for its own security would have to take such acts as were necessary in its own judgment.

The President also asked me to tell Secretary Hull that he wished to see the Japanese Ambassador immediately upon his return and that warning which had been suggested as a parallel action by Mr. Churchill was communicated to the Japanese Ambassador by the President on August 17th of that year.

.

Page 468

Mr. Murphy. There have been rumors throughout the country, in several of the papers, to the effect that at the Atlantic Conference, there was a promise by the President of the United States to the Prime Minister of England, Mr. Churchill that we would stall the Japanese for a period--that is a free translation--stall the Japanese for a period of about 4 months.

Mr. Gearhart. Baby them.

Mr. Murphy. I am using the word "stall." My colleague suggests "baby them" along. At any rate, was there any promise, so far as you know, on the part of the President of the United States, or any commitment by him, to the Prime Minister of England, that we would stall, baby them along, or anything of that nature, for a period of 4 months?

Mr. Welles. The only promise made by the President, Mr. Congressman,

to the best of my knowledge and belief, is that I have already stated, namely that the United States would take parallel action with the British Government in warning the Japanese Government that we could not regard with indifference their continued expansion.

Mr. Murphy. And nothing else?

Mr. Welles. It was also the President's agreement, if it can be called that, an understanding was reached that the United States would again undertake the negotiations which, you remember, had been broked off when the Japanese moved into Indochina, would again undertake negotiations with the Japanese Government in an effort to avoid war.

.

辯護側文書一五〇〇一K一六

眞珠灣攻撃拔萃 第二卷

四五九頁

前國務次官サムナー、ウエルズ證言

ゲゼル氏、ルーズヴェルト大統領とチャーチル首相との太平洋會談中貴下は出席して居られましたか。

ウエルズ氏、して居りました。

ゲゼル氏、北米合衆國と英國とが太平洋で共同動作をとることに關しル
ルーズヴェルト大統領とチャーチル首相との間に到達した合意取極又は協定に付（若しありとすれば）同會談で何等かの情報をうけられましたか。

ウエルズ氏、大統領は私よりも先にワシントンに歸ることになつて居りましたので私が大統領と別れた時大統領は日本の状態並びに極東に於ける増加しつつある危険についてチャーチル氏と會談をした事。チャーチル氏は大統領に英米兩國は何等かの効果を齎す手段として日本政



府に警告を發する事につき並行的措置をとるべきであると示唆しました。私の記憶によれば大統領はチャール氏が示唆した事は米國政府は日本政府に對し若しも日本が征服と侵略の政策も固執するならば米國はその合法的利益を保護する爲並にその安全を保持するためその必要と判斷するが如き措置をとらなければならないと云ふことを表明すべきであるといふ事でした。

大統領は又歸つたり早速日本大使と會見を希望することをハル長官に告げるやうに私に希望致しました。又チャール氏の示唆した並行的措置である警告は同年八月十七日大統領により日本大使に通知せられました。

四六八頁

マーフィー氏 太平洋會談の際米國大統領が英國首相チャーチル氏に對し米國は日本を暫くの間四ヶ月ばかり丸め込もうと一之はくだけた云ひ方ですが一約束をしたとの噂が國中に傳はり幾つかの新聞にも載せられました。

ギヤハート氏 赤ん坊の様にあやす

マーフィー氏 私は「丸め込む」と云ふ言葉を使つてゐますが私の同僚は「赤ん坊の様にあやす」と云ふ言葉を使つてゐます。ともかく貴下の御存知の限りでは米國大統領は英國首相に、米國は四ヶ月間日本を丸め込むとか赤ん坊のやうにあやすとか何かその様な性質の約束をしたことがありますか。

ウエルズ氏 大統領のした約束は私の知り又信ずる所では私は既に述べたことだけであります。即ち米國は日本が防牒を繼續する場合無關心ではあり得ないと云ふことを日本政府に警告する事につき英國政府と並行的措置をとると云ふことでありました。

マーフィー氏 その他には何もありませんか。

ウエルズ氏 若しそう云へるならば次の事も大統領の約束でありました、
即ち御承知の通り日本が印度支那に進駐してから交渉は中絶してゐたの
ですが之を戦争を避けるため日本政府と再びしようと云ふ諒解が成立し
たのです。

D. D. 1500-L-1

AT 2230 (LOCAL TIME) ON 18 JUNE, 1940, SENT THE FOLLOWING
TO COMMANDANT, 14TH NAVAL DISTRICT:

SECRET

"WOULD LIKE TO KNOW WHETHER REQUEST OF COMMANDING GENERAL
HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT FOR ADDITIONAL AIR PATROL IS A PART
OF ARMY EXERCISE OR IS IT BASED UPON INFORMATION FROM THE
WAR DEPARTMENT".

AT 0945 (LOCAL TIME) ON 19 JUNE, 1940, THE FOLLOWING
REPLY WAS RECEIVED:

CONFIDENTIAL

"REQUEST OF COMMANDING GENERAL WAS BASED UPON A DIRECTIVE
FROM THE WAR DEPARTMENT X HE HAS NO INFORMATION AS TO
WHETHER OR NOT IT IS AN EXERCISE"



辯護圖書第一五〇〇一L-1

一九四〇年（昭和十五年）六月十八日二十二時（地方時間）左の如く
第一西海軍管区司令官へ打電した

秘

「ハワイ方面司令官の空中偵察を強化せよとの要求は軍演習の一部であるか又は米陸軍管区よりの通告に基くものであるかを知りたし」
一九四〇年（昭和十五年）六月十九日九時四十五分（地方時間）左の
返電を受けた

電 秘

「司令官の要求は陸軍管区からの指令に基く
それが演習であるか否かに關する情報は得てゐない」



Defense Doc. No. 1500-L-2

Excerpt from Exhibit No. 32 of the Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack - Congress of the United States, Seventy-Ninth Congress, First Session.

EXHIBIT NO. 32

MESSAGES BETWEEN WAR DEPARTMENT AND HAWAII
FROM JULY 8 to SEPTEMBER 7, 1941

(3) 16 October 1941 from CNO to Kimmel et al. Subject: Japanese Cabinet Range.

(3) Drafter: Op-12.
From: C N O.
Released by: Ingersol.

Date: October 16, 1941.

Addressees Priority
For action
CINCLANT
CINCPAC
CINCAF
(Acknowledge)

162203 CR 0534

The resignation of the Japanese cabinet has created a grave situation X If a new cabinet is formed it will probably be strongly nationalistic and anti American X If the Konoye cabinet remains the effect will be that it will operate under a new mandate which will not include rapprochement with the US X In either case hostilities between Japan and Russia are a strong possibility X Since the US and Britain are held responsible by Japan for her present desperate situation there is also a possibility that Japan may attack these two powers X In view of these possibilities you will take due precautions including such preparatory deployments as will not disclose strategic intention nor constitute provocative actions against Japan X Second and third adees inform appropriate army and naval district authorities X
Acknowledge XX
Secret

(Page 1327 of Volume 14 "Pearl Harbor Attack" Series)



辯護御書類一五〇〇一L-二

第七十九米國議會第一會議

眞珠灣攻撃合同調査委員會

書證第三十二號拔萃

書證第三十二號

自昭和十六年七月八日至九月七日陸軍省ハワイ閣議信集

(三) 一九四一年(昭和十六年)十月十六日海軍作戦部長より

キムメル其他宛。題目。日本内閣の更迭。

(三) 起草者。O P I 十二。

海軍作戦部長より。

送信者。インガソル。

日附。一九四一年十月十六日。

發送先、左ノ順ニヨリ

CINCLANT

CINCPAC

CINCAF

(受領報告)



一六二二〇三

C R O 五三四

日本内閣の辭職は事態を重大化した。新内閣が若し成立するとすればそれは甚だしく國家主義的且反米的のものにならう。

若し近衛内閣が留任するとしても結果に於ては同内閣は、米國と。妥協を含まざる新しき訓令の下に行動するであらう。

何れにせよ日、蘇間に戦争の可能性は極めて多い。

且又、日本は現下の自己の窮狀に對する責任を米國及英國に歸して居る爲日本は此等兩國を攻撃する可能性がある。かゝる可能性に鑑み、貴下は戰略的意圖を漏洩せず、又、日本に對する挑発的行爲とならざる範圍に於て準備行動を行ひ、その他然るべき警戒策を講ぜられたい。第二及び第三の受信者は適宜の陸軍地區當局に傳達されたい。

受領報告の事。

機密

(眞珠灣攻撃叢書第十四卷、一三二七頁)

Excerpt from Exhibit No. 33 of the Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack - Congress of the United States, Seventy-Ninth Congress, First Session.

EXHIBIT NO. 33

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES PREPARED BY G-2, WAR DEPARTMENT,
WASHINGTON, D.C.

(25) 26 November 1941, Subject: Japanese Naval Task Force.

NOVEMBER 26, 1941

Memorandum for the Chief of Staff:

Subject: Japanese Naval Task Force.

The following information was received from the Commandant 14th Naval District through the Office of Naval Intelligence at 12:45 a.m., this date:

1. The Japanese have been organizing a naval task force for the past month comprising:

a. Second Fleet: Under the command of Commander-in-Chief, Second Fleet. (The Second Fleet corresponds roughly to our Scouting Force, consisting mainly of strong Cruiser Divisions).

b. Third Fleet which formerly was the China Coast Command Force including its first and second base forces, constituted by miscellaneous small vessels.

c. Combined Air Force consisting of all large carrier forces.

d. Also destroyer squadron 3, air squadron 7, submarine squadron 5, and possibly 1 battleship division from First Fleet consisting of 3 battleships.

Summary of Above: 14 Heavy Cruisers, 4 Light Cruisers, 10 Carriers, 3 Light Cruisers. 2 Destroyer Squadrons (24 destroyers), 2 Submarine Squadrons (18 submarines), and possibly 3 battleships.

2. The combined air force has assembled in Takao, Formosa, with some units believed in Hainan Island. The Third Fleet is believed moving in direction of Takao and Bako, Pescadores off West Coast of Formosa, from home waters in Japan. Units from the Second Fleet are at present possibly enroute to South China as advance scouts. Strong concentration of submarines and air groups in the Marshalls. Present location other units of this task force are not known.

3. The evaluation put upon the above information by the Commandant, 14th Naval District is that a strong force may be preparing to operate in Southeastern Asia, while component parts thereof may be expected to operate from Palao and the Marshall Islands.

SHERMAN MILES,

Brigadier General, U. S. Army,
Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2.

Distribution:

Secretary of War
Assistant Chief of Staff, W.P.D.
I.B. File
Far East Section
Record Section

(Page 1366, Volume 14 - "Pearl Harbor Attack")



合衆國第七十九議會第一期

直珠門攻勢調査合同委員會會議第三十三號ヨリノ拔萃

卷第三十三號

華府、陸軍省、G. 製作ニヨル軍事情報判定

一九四一年十一月二十六日

四目日本海軍機動部隊

一九四一年十一月二十六日

參謀長ヘノ覺書

四目日本海軍機動部隊

以下ノ情報ハ本日本午前十二時四十五分、海軍情報部ヲ通ジ第十四海軍

軍區司令官ヨリ受ケ取ツタモノデアル。

一、日本ハ海軍機動部隊ヲ過去一ヶ月ニワタリ組成シツツアツタ。

ソノ構成要素次ノ如シ。

a、第二機動隊第二機動司令長官ノ指揮下ニアリ。(第二機動ハ主トシ

テ強力ナル巡洋艦隊カラ成リ、大体我が偵察隊ニ相當スル)



多、第三艦隊にコレハ、以前ノ中国沿岸に備へてあり、第一、第二ノ基地部隊ヲ有シ、種々ノ小部隊カラ成ツテキル。

C、聯合空軍に全大型航空母艦ヲ含ム

d、又第三艦隊逐艦隊、第七航空隊、第五潜水艦隊ヲ含ム。而シテ、三つの艦ヨリ成リ一艦隊ヨリ分離セル艦隊一隊モアルモノノ如シ、上記概算に重巡洋艦十四隻、輕巡洋艦四隻、航空母艦十隻、輕巡洋艦三隻、驅逐艦二隻（驅逐艦二十四隻）潜水艦二隻（潜水艦十八隻）及戰艦三隻（憶測）

二、聯合航空隊ハ台灣ノ高雄ニ集結シ敵艦ハ海南島ニアルモノノ如シ。

第三艦隊ハ高雄及ビ台灣西方澎湖諸島中ノ馬公ニ向ケ日本近海ヨリ出動シタル模様ナリ。第二艦隊カラノ各部隊ハ悉ク現在偵察隊トシテ南支ヘ向ケ航行中デアル。「マーシャル」群島ニオイテ潜水艦及空軍ノ強度集結アリ、ロノ機動部隊中ノ他ノ諸分隊ノ現在ノ位置ハ不明デアル。

上記報告ニ基ク第十四海軍區司令官ノ判定ハ、南東アジア方面ニ於

テ強力ナル部隊ガ行動ヲ準備シツツアル可能性アリ、而シテ、ソノ一部ハ、バラオ及ビマーシャル群島方面ヨリ出陣スルヤモ計リ難シト。

合衆國陸軍海將

参謀次長代理 G-2

配布先 陸軍長官

参謀次長、

情報部

海軍部

記録課

(「真珠湾攻撃」第十四卷一三六六頁)

Excerpt from Exhibit No. 44 of the Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack - Congress of the United States, Seventy-Ninth Congress, First Session.

EXHIBIT NO. 44

COPIES OF DEFENSE PLANS

Contents

- Item
1. Extracts from Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan - Orange (1938)
 2. Extracts from Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan - Rainbow No. 1
 3. Extracts from Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan - Rainbow No. 5
 4. Extracts from War Department Operations Plan - Rainbow No. 5
 5. Extracts from Hawaiian Defense Project, Revision 1940
 6. Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, Hawaii
 7. Annex No. VII to Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, Hawaii
 8. Joint Air Estimate, Hawaii (Martin-Bellinger Agreement)
 9. 5 November 1941 Standing Operating Procedure, Hawaiian Department
 10. Field Order No. 1 NS (Naval Security), Hawaiian Department
 11. Extracts from Navy Basic War Plan - Rainbow No. 5
 12. Pacific Fleet Confidential Letter 20L-41 (Revised) - Security of Fleet at Base and in Operating Areas
 13. Operations Plan No. 1-41. Headquarters, Naval Base Defense Force, Fourteenth Naval District

- (1) EXTRACTS FROM JOINT ARMY AND NAVY BASIC WAR PLAN - ORANGE (1938)

SECTION I - DIRECTIVE

This JOINT ARMY AND NAVY BASIC WAR PLAN - ORANGE - shall constitute the basis upon which all Army Plans - ORANGE, all Navy Plans - ORANGE, all Joint Plans - ORANGE, and all supporting allocations for an ORANGE war shall be formulated and developed.

SECTION II - ASSUMPTIONS

This Plan is applicable to any probable situation between UNITED STATES and ORANGE which requires action by the armed forces. The character of the particular situation that may arise cannot be predicted, but in general it may be assumed that -

1. There will be a period of strained relations preceding the outbreak of war with ORANGE, during which period preparatory measures prior to mobilization can be taken.

2. Active hostilities against the UNITED STATES by ORANGE will be precipitated without a formal declaration of war.

3. The superiority of the UNITED STATES naval strength over that of ORANGE will be adequate to permit operations by the UNITED STATES FLEET to the westward of OAHU; and any assistance which may be given to ORANGE or to the UNITED STATES by other powers will not materially reduce this superiority.

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(Page 1423, Part 15 - "Pearl Harbor Attack")



辯護國文書第千五百號Lノ四

アメリカ合衆國第七十九議會第一會期

軍務委員會共同調査委員會審議第四十四號拔萃

警備第四十四號

防禦計畫ノ爲シ

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十、布達局、野戰命令第壹號 海軍防禦

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基地及ビ作戰地域ニ於テノ警戒保護。

十三、第十四海軍々管區海軍基地防禦軍司令部作戰計畫第一號ノ四十一

(一) 海軍共同基本作戰、オレンヂ（千九百三十八年）ヨリノ抜萃

第一節 指令

コノ海軍共同基本作戰計畫「オレンヂ」ハ、海軍計畫（オレンヂ）ノ凡テ、海軍計畫（オレンヂ）ノ凡テ、共同計畫（オレンヂ）ノ凡テ、及ビ「オレンヂ」戦艦ヲニ必要ナル北緯ノ凡テヲ、依ツテ以テ作戰或は開スベキ海軍ヲナス。

第二節 假定

コノ作戰計畫ハ、アメリカ、オレンヂ同ニ起リ得ル事態ニシテ軍隊ノ行動ヲ必要トスル如何ナル蓋然的事態ニモ適用スル。蓋然的事態ノ具體

的實質ヲ據言スルコトハ不可能デアルガ、一般のニ見テ次ノ場合ハ關係
ガ出來ル。

一、オレンヂトノ開戦ニ先立ツテ或ル期間切迫シタ關係ガ續クガ、コノ期
間中ニ、勳員前ノ準備手段ヲ講スルコトガ出來ル。

二、オレンヂニヨル正式ノ宣戦布告ナキ對米戰綫行爲ガ促進サレルデアラ
ウ。

三、オレンヂ海軍力ニ對スルアメリカ海軍力ノ優越ハ米艦隊ヲシテソノ作
戰ヲオアフ西方迄延長スルコトヲ許スニ足リ、第三國ガオレンヂ或ハ
アメリカニ與ヘルガ如キ援助ハソノ如何ナルモノナルモノニモセヨ、
米海軍力ノコノ優越ヲ實質的ニ削減スルコトハナイ。

(「眞珠灣攻撃」第十五卷千四百二十三頁)

Proceedings of the Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack - Congress of the United States, Seventy-Ninth Congress, First Session.

Excerpt from testimony of Adm. Harold R. Stark - Friday, January 4, 1946.

.....

Admiral STARK. I should say we were both making overt (6158) ts against each other. I was asked with regard to that by - I have forgotten which congressional committee, I was appearing before a number of them regularly - and I stated and it will undoubtedly be in the record somewhere, that in my opinion it did not make much difference what we did; that Hitler had every reason, if he wanted to exercise it so far as international law was concerned, to go to war with us at any time but that he would choose his own time and it would be a cold-blooded decision with him as to when that time would be most effective.

Mr. GEARHART. Now, an overt act against Germany in 1941 constituted an overt act against Japan in law, did it not?

Admiral STARK. No, sir; not in my opinion. We were not at war with Japan. Japan was not at war with anybody except the Chinese. We were endeavoring - that is, the President and Mr. Hull were, in my opinion, and I was close to them - not to precipitate a war in the Pacific.

Mr. GEARHART. Yes; but didn't it ever enter into your discussions as a member of the war council consisting of the President, the three Secretaries and the two Chiefs of Staff, didn't it ever enter into your discussions as to whether or not an overt act of a military nature against Germany might constitute or also constituted an overt act against the Japan- (6159) ese?

Admiral STARK. I do not recall it. I had never thought of it until you just asked the question.

Mr. GEARHART. Well, let me direct your attention to page 84 in Peace and War. I will read you a paragraph:

On September 27, 1940 Germany, Italy and Japan signed a far reaching treaty of alliance. In that treaty it was provided that Japan recognized and respected the leadership of Germany and Italy in the establishment of a new order in Europe; that Germany and Italy recognized and respected the leadership of Japan in the establishment of a new order in Greater Asia; and that the three countries would assist one another with all political, economic and military means when one of the powers was attacked by a power not then involved in the European war or in the Chinese-Japanese conflict.

Now, it would appear from that, would it not, that Japan became obligated to attack the United States under its agreement with Germany and Italy of September 27, 1940, upon the United States attacking Germany?

Admiral STARK. Yes; I think that is correct, although I believe that the State Department might testify to the fact that Japan in the last analysis would make her own decision as to carrying out that provision and she would or would not, (6160) according to whether or not it would be useful to her.

Mr. GEARHART. Well, do you agree with this conclusion which is drawn by the writer of this book, evidently with the approval of the Secretary of State of that day:

The last of these provisions obviously was aimed directly at the United States.

Admiral STARK. Yes; I think that may be correct, sir. I think that they had us in mind.

Mr. GEARHART. Then it was the belief of the State Department, and possibly of the War Council, that Germany, Italy, and Japan had in mind belligerent action on the part of the United States at the time they entered into that agreement?

Admiral STARK. I think so, at least a possibility of it. I might add that for a long period our diplomatic effort was to pry Japan loose from that Axis set-up or Tri-Partite agreement.

Mr. GEARHART. Well, you were familiar with the intercepts, in one of which the Japanese in Washington, or rather, in Tokyo informed Berlin of their steadfast adherence to the Tri-Partite agreements?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. So far as anything that has ever been acquired along the line through any of the intercepts or through any of the discussions with the Japanese Ambassadors, no progress was made towards separating the Japanese from their Axis (6161) obligations.

Admiral STARK. No, sir; we didn't get to first base on that.

Mr. GEARHART. Yes. And the intercepts told you, all of the time that we were negotiating with them, that the Japanese were adhering strictly to their Axis obligations?

Admiral STARK. I believed there was one intercept showing Germany's dissatisfaction with the fact that Japan was not doing more, at least one.

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辯護側文書第一五〇〇—L—五號

第七十九回米國議會第一會期、眞珠灣攻撃調査共同委員會議事録

一九四六年一月四日、金曜日、ハロルド、R、スターク提督證言拔萃

◎スターク提督、我々は双方ともお互を對象として公然たる行爲をやつて居つたと言つてよいでしょう。(六一五八)私はどの委員會だつたか忘れましたが、私は若干の委員會に几帳面に出席して居ましたが議會のある委員會でそのことについて尋ねられました。その時私は次の如く陳述しました。これはどこかの記録に載つてゐることは疑ひないと思ひますが、即ち私の考へでは、我々が如何なる事をするかは大した問題ではないといふ事、又、ヒットラーは、國際法の關する限り、彼が戦争をしやうと欲するならば、何時でも我國と戦争を始める凡ゆる理由を持つてゐた事、然し彼は自らその實行の時期を選ぶであらう。また、其の最も効果的な時期は何時であるかに付いては彼は冷靜に之を決定するであらうといふ事を述べました。

◎ギニアハート氏、さて、一九四一年に於ける公然たる對獨行爲は法律上、公然たる對行爲を構成したのではありませんか。

◎スターク提督、いえ、私の考へでは違ひます。我々は日本と戦争してゐませんでした。日本は中國人以外の何れの國とも戦争してゐませんでした。我々は、太平洋に於ける戦争を促進しない様に努力中でありました。我々という意味は大統領とハル氏のことです。そして私はこの二人と密接な關係にあつたのです。大統領とハル氏はその努力をしておつたと私は考えております。

◎ギニアハート氏、そうです、併し、大統領、三長官及陸軍參謀總長海軍作戦部長を以て構成されてゐた戦争會議の一員として、ドイツに敵對する軍事的性質を帯びた公然の行動は、日本に對する公然の敵對行動を構成するかも知れないとか又構成するものであるかどうかといふ事が貴方が論議をされた時間問題とけなりましたか。(六一五九)

◎スターク提督、私は記憶しません。貴方が只今質問なされる迄、私はそいふ事に氣付きませんでした。

◎ギ―アハート氏、それでは「平和と戦争」中の八四頁に御注意下さい。貴方の爲めその一節を朗読致します。

一九四〇年（昭和十五年）九月二十七日、ドイツ、イタリー及び日本は重大な關係ある同盟條約を締結した。

同條約中には、日本は歐洲新秩序の確立にあたり獨伊の指導性を認め、且つ尊重する事、獨伊は大東亞新秩序の樹立にあたり日本の指導性を認め、且つ尊重する事而して三國中の一國が當時歐洲戦争又は日華紛争に参加してない或る國から攻撃を受ける様な場合は、凡ゆる政治的、經濟的及び軍事的手段を以て相互に援助すべき事が規定してあつた。

さて右の事から米國がドイツを攻撃したる場合、日本は、一九四〇年（昭和十五年）九月二十七日の獨伊との協定により、米國を攻撃する義務を有することとなつたように思われるではありませんか。

◎スターク提督、そうです。私はその通りだと思ひます。併し私は國務省が次の事實につき斷言し得ると信じます。即ち日本は結局右の條項

の實行については日本自らその決定をなすであらう。而してその實行が日本によつて有利であるか否かに依つて、右の決定をするか或はしないかを決するであらう。といふ事であります。(六一六〇)

◎ギーアハート氏、それでは、當時の國務省が明かに承認していた此の本の著者の次の結論に貴方は同意しますか。即ち、此の最後の條項は明かに直接米國を目標として居つたといふ事に。

◎スターク提督、左様、その通りだらうと思ひます。彼等は我々の事を念頭においてゐたと思ひます。

◎ギーアハート氏、それではドイツ、イタリー及日本が該協定を結んだ當時、彼等は米國側の戦争的行動を考へに入れてゐたといふ事は國務省並びに、恐らく戦争會議の信念でありましたか。

◎スターク提督、そう思ひます。少くともその可能性はありました。私が附け加へたい事は、長年の間、我々の外交上の勢力は、日本を樞軸機構即ち三國協定から引き離さうとするものであつた事であります。

◎ギーアハート氏、さて、貴方は傍受電報をよく知つて居ましたか。

その中の一つはワシントン駐在の、否寧ろ東京の日本當局が彼等の三國協定に對して確固支持する事をベルリンに通報していましたが。

◎スターク提督、けい承知しておりました。

◎ギーアハート氏、傍受電報又は日本大使との論議を通じて我々が獲得した事柄に關する限り、日本國民を樞軸側に對する義務から引離す方向には何等進捗して居らなかつたのですか。(六一六一)

◎スターク提督、そうです。我々はその事に關しては一疊にも達してなかつたのです。

◎ギーアハート氏、なるほど、そして我々が彼等と交渉してゐた時を通じて、傍受電報によつて、日本國民は嚴重にその樞軸への義務を守つていたことは貴君に判つていたのですか。

◎スターク提督、日本が忠實に支持してゐないといふ事實に對するドイツ側の不滿を示してゐる傍受電報が一つあつたと思ひます。少くとも一つは。

Excerpts from PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
(United States Government Printing Office--Washington: 1946)

Vol. II

Page 429

TESTIMONY OF CORDELL HULL, FORMER SECRETARY OF STATE

Mr. Hull's statement. . . . On November 7, I attended the regular Cabinet meeting. It was the President's custom either to start off the discussion himself or to ask some member of the Cabinet a question. At this meeting he turned to me and asked whether I had anything in mind. I thereupon pointed out for about 15 minutes the dangers in the international situation. I went over fully developments in the conversations with Japan and emphasized that in my opinion relations were extremely critical and that we should be on the lookout for a military attack anywhere by Japan at any time. When I finished, the President went around the Cabinet. All concurred in my estimate of the dangers. It became the consensus of the Cabinet that the critical situation might well be emphasized in speeches in order that the country would, if possible, be better prepared for such a development.

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While the modus vivendi proposal was still under consideration, I emphasized the critical nature of this country's relations with Japan at the meeting of the War Council on November 25. The War Council, which consisted of the President, the Secretaries of State, War and Navy, the Chief of Staff and the Chief of Naval Operations, was a sort of a clearing house for all the information and views which we were currently discussing with our respective contacts and in our respective circles. The high lights in the developments at a particular juncture were invariably reviewed at those meetings. At that meeting I also gave the estimate which I then had that the Japanese military were already poised for attack. The Japanese leaders were determined and desperate. They were likely to break out anywhere, at any time, at any place, and I emphasized the probable element of surprise in their plans. I felt that virtually the last stage had been reached and that the safeguarding of our national security was in the hands of the Army and the Navy.

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On November 28, at a meeting of the War Council, I reviewed the November 26 proposal which we had made to the Japanese, and pointed out that there was practically no possibility of an agreement being achieved with Japan. I emphasized that in my opinion the Japanese were likely to break out at any time with new acts of conquest and that the matter of safeguarding our national security was in the hands of the Army and the Navy. With due deference I expressed my judgment that any plans for our military defense should include an assumption that the Japanese might make the element of surprise a central point in their strategy and also might attack at various points simultaneously with a view to demoralizing efforts of defense and of coordination.

On November 29 I expressed substantially the same views to the British Ambassador.

I said the same things all during those days to many of my contacts.

REPLIES TO INTERROGATORIES PROPOUNDED BY THE HONORABLE
HOMER FERGUSON, MEMBER OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE
INVESTIGATION OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

15. Answer: On November 9, 1941, the Australian Minister called on me and brought up the question of his conferring with the Japanese representative, Mr. Kurusu, and suggesting to Kurusu that Australia would be glad to act as a mediator. I offered no objection to his taking such a step, but merely stated my opinion to the Minister that the diplomatic stage was over and that nothing would come of such a move.

43. Question: What did you do to obtain the time as asked for by Marshall and Stark in their memorandums of November 5 and 2
44. Question: Did you discuss this question with the President and what was said by the President and you in that discussion?

Answer: Generally speaking, our entire 8 months of conversations involved gaining time. There was no conflict between this objective and our intensive efforts to persuade the Japanese to pursue policies of peace. After the Imperial Conference at Tokyo on July 2, 1941, the Japanese in pursuance of the decision to move south, proceeded rapidly with the necessary preparations for a military movement on a large scale.

It was obvious that the time of such attack at Japan would be of Japan's own choosing, and would depend upon Japan's own estimate of her readiness and of favoring circumstances. It was not within the power of this Government otherwise than by abject submission to Japan's terms, to halt Japan in her course. However, I endeavored at all times to treat with the Japanese in a spirit of open-mindedness, patience and goodwill. I sought from the outset of the conversations to explore thoroughly every possibility of bringing about a peaceful, fair and stabilizing settlement of the situation in the Pacific, and I spared no effort to keep always open a door to the continuation of the conversations. At the same time I had to be on guard against any manifestation of weakness which might have encouraged the Japanese to be more precipitate than they were in their action. In this way, I believe that we gained months of valuable time. It became clear, however, in October, as I saw it, that the Japanese had decided to strike in their own time, unless this Government should be willing to yield abjectly to Japan's terms. I constantly discussed with the President the question of gaining as much time as possible and we had the subject very much in mind throughout the conversations with the Japanese.

49. Question: Did the Secretary of State's office prepare a final draft, one ready for delivery to the Japanese, of a modus vivendi?

Answer: A draft of the modus vivendi dated November 25 which was labeled "Final draft," meaning that that was the last draft that was made of that document, had been furnished the committee. It cannot be accurately said that that draft was "ready for delivery to the Japanese," as it is

impossible to tell what further revision might have been made if a decision had been made to offer the Japanese a modus vivendi.

49. Question: Did you show such a draft to the Ambassadors of Britain, China, and the Netherlands?

Answer: The latest draft of the modus vivendi shown to the British, Chinese and Netherlands diplomatic representatives was the draft of November 24. There were only minor differences between the November 24 and the November 25 drafts.

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53. Question: Was it before or after you learned of the pilot message, being message 901, exhibit 1, page 238?
54. Question: Was it before or after you learned that Japan was replying to your November 26 message?
55. Question: Was it before or after you knew the contents of any part of the 14-part message, a reply to your November 26 message?
56. Question: Had you learned of the receipt of any of the 13 parts of the 14-part message, being message 902, page 239, exhibit before it was decided by the President, or by you, to send a message to the Emperor?
84. Question: When did you first learn that the Japanese were replying to your note of November 26?
85. Question: When did you first see any of the parts of the 14-part message 902, exhibit 1, page 239?
86. Question: When did you first learn that the message was to be delivered in accordance with a time later to be determined?
87. Question: When did you first see the message No. 844, page 195, exhibit 1, which contained the language: "therefore, with a report of the views of the Imperial Government on this American proposal which I will send you in 2 or 3 days, the negotiations will be de facto ruptured. This is inevitable. However, I do not wish to give the impression that the negotiations are broken off."

Answer: I cannot recall definitely the exact time when any of the messages referred to were seen by me.

During the period in which those messages were being received and distributed, my attention was focused on reports of the extremely menacing movement made manifest by the sailing of the large Japanese armada from the jumping-off place in Indochina. Those reports thus were of more serious and urgent import than any threatening phase of intercepted messages relating to Japan's reply to our communications of November 26. As I made clear in my conversations and statements during those last days prior to Pearl Harbor, I felt that war would break out at any time and that the Japanese had given clear indication as to the course they would take. Notification through the intercepts of a forthcoming Japanese communication announcing that the Japanese would not continue the conversations was only confirmatory of the judgment which I had been passing on to my colleagues in the Government during the previous fortnight.

Even had the intercepted messages clearly indicated

Page 5386 (continued)

immediate war, they could only have referred to attack by the gathering Japanese forces whose movements we had been watching for days.

From the time the Japanese presented their drastic ultimatum on November 20, no intimations were given us that the Japanese would make the slightest concessions in their demands, but, on the contrary, they drove steadily forward to the attack with their armed forces, while, at the same time misrepresenting the attitude of this Government. The Japanese reply of December 7 was a false and fraudulent statement in the worst of bad faith of Japan's case and a monstrous misrepresentation of our position in what turned out to be a brazen attempt to shift from themselves to us responsibility for their attack upon us.

Questions 57 to 60 are grouped in a single answer.

57. Did you discuss with the President the modus vivendi message?
58. Question: If so, what was said about it by the President and what did you say to the President?
59. Question: Did you ever discuss with the President the fact that you were not going to send the modus vivendi but were going to send the note of the 26th?
60. Question. If you had such a conversation or discussion with the President about that date on the modus vivendi will you give us the conversation?

Answer: I was in constant touch with the President and consulted him fully at all stages of our consideration of the modus vivendi proposal. It is impossible to recall the details of the discussion, but the trend of our thought was indicated in my statement before the committee on November 19, 1945. The President at no time expressed any dissent from views expressed by me. On November 26 I recommended to the President--and he approved-- my calling in the Japanese representatives and handing them the broad basic proposals while withholding the modus vivendi plan.

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Questions 79 and 80 are grouped in a single answer.

79. Question: Did you the diplomatic relations between Japan and America grow worse after November 27?
80. Question. If they did grow worse how do you account for no other message being given to the commanders in the field?

Answer: Diplomatic relations between Japan and the United States could scarcely grow worse after November 27, except in the sense that the crisis foreseen by us and planned by the Japanese approached closer at hand. There was nothing fundamentally new in the diplomatic situation. That situation as we viewed it, especially from November 21 until the attack on Pearl Harbor, was that Japan might strike at any time and that the diplomatic establishment could not be expected to preserve national security.

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88. Question: Did not that message 844, exhibit 1, page 195, indicate to you that your note of the 26th was not acceptable and therefore that war was imminent?

Answer: I was already satisfied that the Japanese would not agree to anything short of complete yielding by the United States to Japan's demands. The intercepted Japanese message to which you refer did no more than confirm what we already knew. As I have pointed out repeatedly Japan was bent on attacking us unless we made abject surrender to her demands as an aggressor. We had no serious thought that Japan would accept our proposal of November 26.

辯護側文書一五〇〇一六號

「眞珠灣攻撃」抜萃

(米國政府印刷局、華府一九四六年)

第二卷

四二九頁

前國務長官、コーデル。ハルの證言

ハル氏の陳述

……十一月七日定例開議ニ出席しました。大統領の習慣として自身で討議の口を切るか或は開員の誰かに質問を發するのを常としました。この會議では大統領は私に向ひ、何か意見があるかどうかを聞きました。そこで私は約十五分間程國際狀勢の危機を指摘しました。私は日本との會談の全貌を述べ、私の意見では關係は極度に危局に面してをり、日本により何時、何處に對して爲されるかもしれぬ軍事的攻撃に對し警戒をなすべきであると強調しました。私が語り終へた時、大統領

領は閣員の意見を徴されました。全員私の危機の予測に同意致しました。その様な局面の展開に對して米國が、よりよく準備する爲にはもし可能であるならば危機の狀態を演説に於いて充分強調すべきだといふことに内閣の意見が一致しました。

× × × × × × × × × ×

四三四頁

暫定取極の提案が尙考慮されてゐる間、私は日本との關係の危險性を十一月二十五日の軍事會議に於て強調しました。大統領國務長官、陸海軍長官、參謀總長、海軍作戰部長より構成せられてゐる軍事會議は夫々の接觸面と又夫々の範圍内で、その時々々に論議されるあらゆる情報や意見の交換所の如きものになつて居りました。特別な時機に於ける局面の發展の最重要點は繼えず之等の會合で検討されて居りました。その會合に於ても又私は日本軍隊は既に攻撃の態勢にあるといふ私の當時抱いてゐた予測を述べました。

日本の指導者達は心を決め、死物狂ひになつてゐる。彼等は何處に、

いつなん時、何れの土地に襲ひかゝるかもしれない。私は彼等の計畫の中の奇襲の要素の確率を強調しました。私は事實上最終の段階に達せること及び我々の國衆的安全の保障は陸海軍の手に委ねられてゐることを感じました。

X X X X X X X X X X

四四〇頁

十一月二十八日、軍事會議に於て私は、我々が日本に對して爲した十一月二十六日の提案を検討し、日本と協定に到達する可能性の實際的に全く無きことを指摘しました。私は私見に依れば日本はなんどき新しい侵略行爲を以て襲ひかゝるかもしれないこと、そして國家に安全の保障は、陸海軍の手に委ねられてゐることを強調しました。

日本は奇襲の要素を以てその作戰の主要點となすであらうし又防禦及連絡の爲の努力を弱めんとして種々なる地點を同時的に攻撃するかもしれないといふ想定の下に我々の軍事的防衛の計畫はなさるべきであるといふ私の判断を申し述べました。

十一月二十九日私は大体に於て同意見を英國大使に語りました。
同じことをその當時を通じ多くの接觸者に語りました。

第十一卷

五三七四頁

眞珠灣攻撃調査合同委員會委員ホーヤー、フアーガソン氏により爲された訊問に對する返答

一五、答、一九四一年十一月九日、オーストラリア公使は私を訪問し、

彼が日本の代表來栖氏と談合し、來栖氏にオーストリアは喜んで仲介者の勞をとらんとするものなることを示唆せんとすることについて質問をしました。私は彼がその様な手をうつことについて異議は申しませんでした。公使に對して外交政略は既に終りかゝる策動からは何等得る所はないであらうといふ私の意見を述べるにとゞめました。

五三八三―八四頁

四三、質問、マーシャル及スタークが十一月五日及二十七日の彼等の覺書の中で要求した時間を得る爲、あなたは如何なることを爲しましたか。

四四、

問、貴下は本問題と大統領と討議しましたか、又その討議に於て大統領と貴下は何を語りましたか。

答、一般的に云ふと我々の會談の全八ヶ月は時をかせぐことにありました。此の目的と、日本を平和政策を遂行するやうに説得しようとする我々の熱心な努力との間には何等衝突はありませんでした。一九四一年七月二日の東京に於ける御前會議后日本は南進の決定に従ひ、大規模の軍事行動のため必要な準備を迅速に進めました。

日本がなさんとする攻撃の時機は日本自らの撰擇により定まり日本の準備及び好都合な状態を日本が如何に判斷するかによつて定まると云ふことは明らかでありました。日本のやり方を抑制するは日本の條件に従ふのでなければ米國政府の存し得る處ではありませんでした。併し私は常に寛容なる精神、忍耐及び好意を以て日本人を取扱ふやうに努力致しました。私は交渉の最初から太平洋に於ける事態の平和的公平且安定せる解決を招來するための全ての手段を隅な

く探究せんとしたのであります。私は交渉の繼續のため常に門戸を開放して置いたため凡ゆる努力をしました。同時に私は弱身を見せて日本の行動を更に促進することがないように注意せねばなりません。かくして我々は貴重な數ヶ月を稼ぎ得たと信じます。所が私が觀察した所によれば、十月には日本は米國政府が日本の條件に屈從しない限りその欲する時に出撃する決心をした事が明瞭になりました。私は絶えず大統領と出来るだけ時を稼ぐことにつき、討議しました。そして日本との交渉中この事は常に深く念頭に置いてゐたのであります。

四八

問、國務省は暫定取極の最後の草案即ち日本側に交付するためものを用
意しましたか

答、十一月廿五日附の暫定取極案は「最後の草案」と言われてありますが
之は此の種文書の最後の案であつたことを意味するもので、之は委員會
に提出せられました。併し正確に云へば之は「日本側に交付する許り
になつた」案と云ふことは出来ません、と云ふのは日本側に暫定取極案
を提出することに決定された場合更に如何なる修正がなされたかは分ら
ないからであります。

問、御話の様な案を英國支那及び和蘭の大使に見せましたか

答、英國、支那及び和蘭の外交代表に示された一番新しい案は十一月廿四
日附のものであります、併し十一月廿四日の案と今廿五日の案との間に
はごく些細な相異があるだけであります。

五三八五頁

五三

問、それは貴下がパイロット電報即ち第九〇一〇號の電報（誓證第一號二三八頁）を知つた前ですか、後ですか

五四

問、それは日本が貴下の十一月二十六日附書信に答へようとしてゐると云ふことを知つた前ですか、後ですか

五五

問、それは十一月二十六日の貴下の書信に對する返事の十四部分の電報の何れかの部分を知つた前ですか、後ですか

五六

問、大統領又は貴下により天皇に親電を送ることに決定せられた前に電報第九〇二號（二三九頁誓證第一號）の十四部分の十三部中の何れかを受け取つた事を知つてゐましたか。

八四

問 十一月二十六日の貴下のノートに對し、日本が同答しようとしてゐる事を最初に知つたのは何時ですか

八五

問 電報電九〇二號（書證第一號、二三九頁）の十四部の何れかの部分を始めて見たのは何時ですか

八六

問 通報は後に決定せらるべき時間に交付せらるる筈であると言ふ事を始めて知つたのは何時ですか

八七

問 電報八四四號（一九五頁、書證第一號）即ち電報すべき「依て兩三日中に右米案に對する帝國政府の見解申入れを以て、實質的には交渉は打切りとする他なき情勢なるが、交渉決烈の印象を與ふことを欲せず」この言葉を含む電報を始めて見たのは何時ですか

答 御話の電報を私が見た正確な時間ははつきりと思ひ出すことは出来ませ

ん。

之等の電報が受け取られ配布せられてゐた期間中私の注意は印度支那に於ける既出地點から日本の大船隊が出航してゐたことにより示された非常に脅威的な行動の報告に私の注意は集中されて居りました。

之等の報告は十一月廿六日の米國側通告に対する日本側回答に門する傍受電報の脅迫的な局面よりも一層緊急且重要なものでありました。

眞珠灣攻撃に先立つ最後の數時間に於ける會話及陳述で明らかにした通り私は戦争は何時勃發するかも知らない、日本は其の取らんとしてゐる進路も明らかに示してゐたさ感じて居りました。日本は交渉を繼續しないさ云ふことを云つてゐる日本の入電を傍受して知つた事柄は私がその之に先立つ二週間内に米國政府は内の同僚に話してゐた判断を唯確かめたのに過ぎません。

六〇

同 若し貴下がその日暫定取極に付、大統領と合談し又は討議せられたことが有るならば、その合談を御話し下さい。

答

私は即えず大統領に接し暫定取極案の考慮中である段階に於て充分大統領と相談致しました。討議の詳細を思ひ出すことは出来ませんが、我々の考へ方は一九四五年十一月十九日委員会に於てなした、私の陳述中に示されて居ります、大統領は私の表明した見解に不同意を云はれた事はありません、十一月廿六日私は大統領に日本代表を招致し暫定取極案は之を差控えて廣範な基礎的定義を手交することを大統領に勧告しその承認を得ました。

五三九一頁

質 同七九乃至八〇は一同答に之を總括する

七九

同 日米間の外交関係は十一月二十七日以後悪化しましたか

八〇

同 若し悪化したのなら何故戦場に於ける司令官にもつと別の通信をしなかつたのですか

答 日米外交関係は十一月廿七日以后、一層悪くなつたと云ふことは出来ません、只我々の予想し又日本側で計畫してゐた危機が一層手近に迫つたと云ふだけであります。外交状態に何等根本的に新しいものはなかつたのであります、我々の見る所によれば事態は特に十一月廿一日より眞珠湾攻撃に至る間に於ては日本は何時攻撃するかも知れず外交手段により國家の安全を保持することを期待し得なかつたのであります

五三九二頁

八八

同 電報八四四號（密電第一號一九五頁）は貴下の廿六日のノートは受諾せられず、従つて戦争は緊迫してゐることを貴下に示しませんでしたか

答

私は既に米國が日本の要求を完全に容れない限り如何なる事にも日本は之に同意しないと云ふ事も認めて居りましたが、貴下の云はれる傍受日本電報は私が既に知つてゐた事を確かめたるに過ぎません、既に私が繰返し指摘した様に日本は我々が侵略者たる日本の要求に卑屈な降伏をなさざる限り我々を攻撃しようとは決心してゐたのであります。日本が十一月廿六日の米國案を受諾しようとはとても考へられないことでした。

Letter from Admiral J. O. Richardson to Admiral H. R. Stark
(with enclosures) - 18 September 1940.

CinC File No.

UNITED STATES FLEET
U.S.S. ENTERPRISE, Flagship

AIR MAIL
PERSONAL
CONFIDENTIAL

Honolulu, T. H.
18 September 1940.



Dear Betty:

While the Secretary was on board the ENTERPRISE he said to me, "Admiral, will you come to Washington in early October while you are on the Pacific Coast?", I replied, "I can not come to Washington except under orders, but if Stark wants to see me I suppose I will be ordered."

Just before leaving Pearl Harbor the Secretary said, "Admiral, I will talk to Stark and it is possible that we may want you to come to Washington for a conference." I replied, "I will be glad to come any time I am wanted."

I do not know of any benefit to the Navy that would accrue from my coming to Washington as I fully and frankly expressed my views to the Secretary on all points where I felt that such expression might help the Navy or the Nation. I also gave him a memorandum which covered the more important points discussed with him. Nevertheless, if you or the Secretary want me to come I will be pleased to do so.

During the past six months the Fleet has been visited by two Secretaries. During the last visit the Secretary made a most favorable impression upon the officers and men of the Fleet and I have frequently heard officers say, "I hope that Colonel Knox remains as Secretary regardless of the outcome of the election."

In the Fleet we did all we could to show both Secretaries what we are, what we are doing, and what we are thinking. Regardless of whether we made a good impression on the Secretary I believe that it would have boosted our spirits a bit if, upon his departure, he had sent a dispatch to the Fleet in these waters or to Cincus expressing some appreciation of our efforts to show our wares or approbation of our endeavors to maintain an efficient Fleet. Personally I feel that the Fleet made a good impression, and that a dispatch would have been sent had the Secretary been accompanied by a competent aide.

Please tell Nimitz that his letter of 30 August regarding six-year enlistments was delivered to me by the Secretary's Aide on Monday afternoon a few minutes before the Secretary left the ENTERPRISE and after I had completed my serious talks with the Secretary.

With kindest regards and best wishes.

Sincerely,

/s/ J. O. Richardson

J. O. RICHARDSON

Admiral H. R. Stark, U. S. Navy,
Chief of Naval Operations,
Navy Department,
Washington, D. C.

P. S. As far as I know I have nothing to take up with the

D. D. 1500-M-1

Letter from Admiral J. O. Richardson to Admiral H. R. Stark
(with enclosures) - 18 September 1940.

Department that can not be handled by correspondence but
if I am wanted in Washington I am ready to come on arrival
at San Pedro.

/s/ JOR

Defense Note: PS above in "handwriting."

第陸軍部一五〇〇一M一

J・O・リチャードソン大將よりH・R・スターク大將宛書翰（同封
物あり）一九四〇年（昭和十五年）九月十八日

合衆國陸軍

合衆國海軍エンタープライズ號

航空便 親展 極秘

ハワイ、ホノルル （一九四〇年（昭和十五年）九月十八日

ペ テ イ 様

長官がエンタープライズ號にお出の節「大將、太平洋岸に居られる間に十月始めにワシントンへ來てもらえますか」と私に聞いたので私は「命令に依る以外はワシントンへ行く事は出来ませんが若しスタークが私に會ひたいなら私は命令を受けるだらうと思ひます」と答へました。眞珠灣を出發する直前に長官は「大將、スターク氏に話して置きませう。そして會談の爲我々は貴方にワシントンへ來て頂く事にするか



も知れません」と云つたので私は「御用なら何時でも喜んで参ります」と答へました

海軍或は國家に對する援助になるかも知れないと思つた總ての點に關して私は充分に且つ卒直に自分の意見を長官に述べて置きましたから私がワシントンへ行く事に依つて海軍に何の利益があるか分りませんまた私は彼と論じた比較的重要な諸點を網羅した覚書を彼に渡ししました。それにも拘らず若し貴方が長官かが私に來てほしいなら喜んで参ります。

過去六ヶ月間に餘餘は二人の長官の訪問を受けました

最近の訪問中に長官は海軍の將兵に非常に好ましい印象を與へましたそして將校達が「選挙の結果如何に拘らずノック陸軍大佐が長官として留任される事を希望する」と云ふのを暫々聞いた事があります

海軍では私達は自分達がどんな人間であるか何をしてゐるか、何を考へてゐるかを兩長官に示す爲に全力を盡くしました。我々が長官に

よい印象を與へたかごうかは別として若し長官が出立（此の地）の海上にある艦に或は司令長官に打電して手荷品と見せようとする我々の努力に對する感謝或は精銳を保持する我々の努力に對する謝辭を表してくれたならばその事は我々の精神を少し昂揚させたであらうと思ひます
私個人としては我が艦隊は良い印象を與へたと思ひます
そして若し長官が有能な副官を從へてゐたならば電報を打つてくれたであらうと思ひます

八月三日附、六ヶ年兵艦登載に關するニミッツの手紙は月曜日の午後長官がエンタープライスを立ち去る数分前私が長官と重要な會談を遂げた後に長官の副官が私に歸けて呉れた事をニミッツに傳へて下さ

敬 具

署名 J・O・リチャードソン

コロンビア地区ワシントン市海軍省、合衆国海軍、海軍作戦部長

H. R. スターリ海軍大將

追伸 私の知つてゐる限りでは海軍省の事で手紙處理出来ない事は何
もありませんがワシントンへ出頭せよとの事ならサンビドロに到着の
際に出かけられます

署名 (J O R)

海軍省駐

上記追伸は肉筆

Excerpt from Exhibit No. 32 of the Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack - Congress of the United States, Seventy-Ninth Congress, First Session.

EXHIBIT NO. 32

MESSAGHS BETWEEN WAR DEPARTMENT AND HAWAII
FROM JULY 8 to DECEMBER 7, 1941

(5) 24 November 1941 From CNO to Admiral et al. Subject: Warning of Surprise Aggressive Movement.

(5) Sealed Secret
Drafter: Op-12
From: Chief of Naval Operations.
Released by: Ingersoll.

Date: November 24, 1941.

Addressees
For action
CINCAF
CINCPAC
COM 11
COM 12
COM 13
COM 15
For information
SPENAVO LONDON
CINCLANT

242005 CR0443

Chances of favorable outcome of negotiations with Japan very doubtful X This situation coupled with statements of Japanese government and movements their naval and military forces indicate in our opinion that a surprise aggressive movement in any direction including attack on Philippines or Guam is a possibility X Chief of Staff has seen this dispatch concurs and requests action adees to inform senior army officers their areas X Utmost secrecy necessary in order not to complicate an already tense situation or precipitate Japanese action X Guam will be informed separately.
Copy to WPD, War Dept., and to
Op-12 but no other distribution.

(Pages 1327 - 1328 of Volume 14 "Pearl Harbor Attack" Series)



Ref. # 1500-M-2

辯證文書 第一五〇。一

眞珠灣攻撃調査共同委員會書證第三二號ヨリノ抜萃 合衆國

第七十九回會、第一期

書證 第三二號

陸軍省及ビハワイ關ノ通信

一九四一年七月八日ヨリ九月七日迄

(5) 一九四一年十一月二十四日 海軍作戦部長ヨリキムメル等宛件名、奇

攻勢攻撃態勢ニ對スル警告

(F) 秘密

起草者 O P 十二

送信者 海軍作戦部長

受信者 インガソル

受信者

作戦關係

GINOAE

COMPAG

COMP十一

COM十二

COM十三

COM十四

COM十五

情報關係

SPENAVD

GINOAE

RECEIVED JUL 8 1947



File # 1500-11-2

日米會談が圓滿ニ成立スル見込ハ概メテ悉シイ、コノ情勢ニ加フルニ
日本政府聲明並ビニ日本海軍及ビ陸軍ノ移動ハ我々ノ意見デハ、フィリ
ツピン諸島又ハグアム島ノ攻撃ヲ含ム何レノ方向ニテモ奇襲攻撃活動ノ
オソレアル事ヲ示ス。參謀長ハコノ急信ヲ一讀ノ後、警意ヲ表シ各作戦
Adrees ーニ對シ、ソノ位置ヲ陸軍上級士官ニ報告スルヤウ要請シテキ
ル。既に緊迫シタ狀態ヲ紛糾セシメナイ爲ニ又ハ日本ノ行動ニ拍車ヲカ
ケル爲ニ極秘ガ必アリデアル。グアム島ニ對シテハ別ニ報告サレルデアラウ。
陸軍省 W P D 及ビ O P ー十二宛寫シ。他ニ配布セズ

(第十四卷) 眞珠灣攻撃一集 第一三二七頁ー一三二八頁

一九四一年八月八日ヨリ八月十日迄

陸軍省 海軍省 ハルト 陸軍省

第三二四

第十次口會ハ第一回

海軍省 陸軍省 共同委員會 第三二四ヨリ八回迄 合議

海軍省 第一三二七頁ー一三二八頁

Excerpt from Exhibit No. 33 of the Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack - Congress of the United States, Seventy-Ninth Congress, First Session.

EXHIBIT NO. 33

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES PREPARED BY G-2, WAR DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON, D.C.

(27) 29 November 1941, Subject: Brief Periodic Estimate of the Situation December 1, 1941-March 31, 1942.
(Excerpt)

I.B. 159

NOVEMBER 29, 1941.

Memorandum for the Chief of Staff:

Subject: Brief Periodic Estimate of the Situation December 1, 1941-March 31, 1942.

.....

The people and government of the Netherlands East Indies have continued, affirmatively and constructively, to function practically as a sovereign state, loyal to the mother country. As evidence of Dutch spirit, they (a) have reorganized their army, (b) are actively at work manufacturing needed army equipment, (c) are actively training reserves, (d) have expanded their system of air fields throughout the islands, (e) have cooperated with the British and United States governments in preparation of extensive plans for defense, (f) have refused to renew their commercial treaty with Japan, (g) have delivered to Japan only 10,000 tons of oil since January 1, 1941 - said delivery having been on an old contract still in force.

In the Far East the United States is concerned as a possible belligerent and also as a prime source of war materials for China, the British Commonwealth and for the Netherlands East Indies. We are in process of sending a few military airplanes to Thailand. But this theater will be a secondary one from the point of view of supply. Under all circumstances we will continue to be able to supply Australasia, the Dutch East Indies, and probably also China, though somewhat precariously, through the Burma Road. Siberia will become completely cut off if Japan attacks Russia.

Our influence in the Far Eastern Theater lies in the threat of our Naval power and the effort of our economic blockade. Both are primary deterrents against Japanese all-out entry in the war as an Axis partner. If we become involved in war with Japan we could launch a serious offensive against her by Naval and Air forces. But such an attack would fall short of a major strategic offensive because it could not be decisive within a reasonable time, and still more, because it would be a diversion of forces away from rather than toward our objective, the defeat of the Nazis

.....

SHERMAN MILES,
Brigadier General, U. S. Army,
Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2.

Distribution:

The President	Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4
Secretary of War	Assistant Chief of Staff, W.P.D.
Secretary of State	G.H.Q.
Under Secretary of War	Chief of the Air Corps
Assistant Secretary of War	Director of Naval Intelligence
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for Air	General Embick
The Chief of Staff	Record Section
Chief of the Army Air Forces	I.B. File
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1	
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3	

dya

(Pages 1368 - 1373, Volume 14 - "Pearl Harbor Attack")

辯護資料 一五〇〇一M-三

眞珠灣攻撃共同調査委員會證據第三十三號拔萃
第七十九國會第一議會

證據第三十三號

D、O、華盛頓陸軍省G-12作成陸軍情報觀測
(三七) 一九四一年十一月廿九日 首題

一九四一年十二月一日より一九四二年三月三十一日に至る定
期的情況觀測概略(拔萃)

I、B、一五九

一九四一年十一月廿九日

參謀總長に對する覺書

首題、 一九四一年十二月一日より一九四二年三月卅一日に至る

定期的情況觀測概略

南領東印度の政府及び人民は母國に忠實な獨立國として確かに而も建



設的に實際的の役目を引き續き果して居た。和蘭魂の證據として彼等は

(a) 彼等の陸軍を再組織した

(h) 軍備必需品を盛んに製造して居る

(o) 豫備兵の訓練を活潑に行つて居る

(a) 全島に飛行場網を擴大した

(o) 擴大なる防衛計畫準備につき米英政府と協力した

(f) 日本との通商條約更新を拒否した

(g) 日本には一九四一年一月一日以來單に油壹萬噸を供給したに過ぎなかつた

つた。此油は尙を效力を爲して居る舊契約に對する供給分であつた。

極東に於て合衆國は可能交戰國として將又支那、英領聯邦及蘭領東印度

に對する軍需品の努力なる供給源として關心が持たれて居る。我々は泰

國へ數台の軍用飛行機を送らんと志して居る。併し此方面は補給の見地か

らすれば第二次的のものであらう。如何なる事があつても我々は歐洲

蘭領印度への補給が引き續き出来る様にしなくてはならぬ。又支那に對

しては較々不氣乍ら西貢ルート經由より多分補給するであらう。而比

安

利亜は萬一日本が露西亞を攻めせば全然遮断さるゝ事とならう
極東方面に於ける我々の勢力は我々の海軍力と我々の經濟封鎖の勢力と
に歸因する。此二つは何よりも日本が樞軸の相棒として全面的参戰すること
と阻止してゐる最も有力な要因である。若し我々が日本との戦争に捲
き込まれる、事あらば我々は海軍と陸軍とにより日本に對し眞剣な攻勢を
とる事が出来るのである。が斯の如き攻勢は見透しのつく期間内では決
定的のものとなり得ないし後々に勢力を分散してナチの破綻と云ふ我々
の目的から遠ざかる事となるから主作戦的攻勢力の見地から欠くる
がある

處

シエルマン、マイルス

亞米利加合衆國陸軍准將

參謀總長臨時補佐官

分配先——大統領

情報調整官 エムビツク 將官	海軍情報部長	航空兵團長	G・H・Q	參謀總長補佐官 W・P・D	參謀總長補佐官 G・4	參謀總長補佐官 G・3	參謀總長補佐官 G・I	陸軍航空長官	參謀總長	航空長官補佐官	陸軍長官補佐官	陸軍長官	陸軍長官
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記録課
公文書部 I・B

（「真珠湾攻撃」第十四卷
頁一三八—一三七三）

Excerpt from Exhibit No. 49 of the Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack - Congress of the United States, Seventy-Ninth Congress, First Session.

SECRET

U. S. Serial 011512-12(R)

B.U.S.(J)(41)30

Short Title ABC-1

March 27, 1941

UNITED STATES - BRITISH STAFF CONVERSATIONS

REPORT

GENERAL

1. Staff Conversations were held in Washington from January 29, 1941 to March 27, 1941, between a United States Staff Committee representing the Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff of the Army, and a United Kingdom Delegation representing the Chiefs of Staff. Representatives of the Chiefs of Staff of the Dominions of Canada, Australia, and New Zealand were associated with the United Kingdom Delegation throughout the course of these conversations, but were not present at joint meetings.

2. The personnel of the United States Staff Committee and of the United Kingdom Delegation comprise the following:

.....

(Page 1487, Part 15 - "Pearl Harbor Attack")



辯證書類 一五〇〇一M一四

眞珠灣攻撃共同調査委員會證據書類第四九號ヨリノ拔萃
合衆國第七十九議會、第一期
秘

U.S. 連續 〇一一五一二一一二 (R十)

B.U.S. (J一 (四一) 三〇

略稱 A B C 一

一九四一年三月二十七日

米英參謀會談報告

一般

一、一九四一年一月二十九日ヨリ一九四一年三月二十七日迄ワシントンニ於テ海軍作戰部長並ニ陸軍參謀總長ヲ代表セル合衆國參謀委員ト各參謀總長ヲ代表スル英帝國代表團トノ間ニ參謀會談行ハレタリ。カナダ、臺灣、並ニニュージーランド自治領ノ參



Def. Doc. # 1500-M-4

謀長代表者ハ是等ノ會談期間中、英帝國代表國ト連絡シ共同シ
居リタルモ、共同會議ニハ出席セザリキ。
ニ合衆國參謀委員並ニ英帝國代表國ノ人員顔觸レハ以下ノ如シ

(眞珠灣攻撃―第十五部一四八七頁―)

Proceedings of the Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack - Congress of the United States, Seventy-Ninth Congress, First Session.

Excerpt from the testimony of Joseph C. Grew - Tuesday, November 27, 1945.

.

The CHAIRMAN. It is now 12 o'clock. Before recessing the Chair would like, if the committee is willing, inasmuch as paragraphs have been read from Mr. Grew's letter to the President, of December 14, and the President's reply of January 21, the Chair will ask that the full text of both those letters be printed in the transcript of the record at this point.
(The letters referred to follow:)

DEAR FRANK: * * *

In a nutshell that is about the way I regard the present and future situation. No doubt you have seen some of my telegrams which have tried to paint the picture as clearly as has been possible at this post where we have to fumble and grope for accurate information, simply because among the Japanese themselves the right hand often doesn't know what the left hand is doing. Their so-called "new structure" is an awful mess and the bickering and controversy that go on within the Government itself are past belief. Every new totalitarian step is clothed in some righteous-sounding slogan. This, indeed, is not the Japan that we have known and loved.

* * *

(Pages 630 - 632, Part 2 - "Pearl Harbor Attack")



辯護側文書第一五〇〇號M15

合衆國第七九議會第一期

眞珠灣攻撃共同調査委員會議事録

一九四五年十一月二十七日火曜日ジオセフ、シー、グルー證言拔萃

議長「唯今十二時であります。休憩に入るに先立ち議長は委員會が同意せられるならば十二月十四日附大統領宛グルー氏書翰及び一月二十一日附大統領復信は既にその若干を朗讀せられたのでありますから、茲に兩書翰の全文を印刷し記録の寫しのうち採録せられることを望みます。

（右言及せられたる書翰次の如し）

フランク君

簡單に謂つて、私は現在及び將來の情に就いて大体そんな風に見てゐる。貴下は私がこの位地にあつて正確な情報を掴むに奔走しと云ふのは今日本人自身左手がしてゐることを右手は知らぬ有様なのだが、一まあ一やれるだけは明確に情況を描き出そうとした私の電報の幾らかを見て居



られるに違ひないと思ふ。彼等の所謂「新体制」なるものはひどくとりとめのないもので政府自身の内部で行はれて居る口論争論沙汰は全く想像の外だ。全体主義的な新施策は一つ一つ尤もらしい標語にかざられてゐる。今の日本は我々が知つて居り且つ愛して居つた日本とは全く別物だ。

(眞珠灣攻撃第二部六三〇頁―六三二頁)

CinC File No.

UNITED STATES FLEET
U.S.S. ENTERPRISE, Flagship
At Sea,
12 September, 1940.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY:

1. The following notes are submitted on the points which we discussed in my effort to meet your wishes to know officers, learn about ships and find out how you could assist the Fleet's preparation for war.

2. PERSONNEL

(A) Officers.

- (a) Promotion by selection best method yet devised.
- (b) Members should be allowed to serve on two successive boards if circumstances render it advisable (requires change by Congress).
- (c) Sea duty assignments should be based on ability; the most promising officers should be given preference. This would tend to create a division of officers into two classes, the most promising and the least promising, or an A and B list.
- (d) The abuses of retirement for physical disability and the retention on active duty and delayed retirement of the physically unfit should be corrected.

(B) Enlisted Personnel.

- (a) While the enlisted strength increased 11,349 between 23 May and 15 August, the Fleet in the Pacific made a net gain of only about 600. Our enormous expenditures for material may prove futile unless there is a prompt and commensurate personnel expansion.
- (b) The bottleneck of the training stations, limiting the rate of acceptance of new men, should be eliminated at once and emergency expansion should begin now without awaiting deficiency appropriations. We have not waited for specific appropriations in providing material expansion, and it is difficult to understand or explain to the Fleet why we are unable or unwilling to meet even more vital problems of personnel (involving the imperative necessity of making ready what we already have as well as training men for new construction) with equally direct and effective action. I estimate the time necessary to make a modern man-of-war's-man at 4 years. You can see the necessity of getting started on this training right away.

(C) Separate Air Corps.

- (a) Unquestionably a higher degree of cooperation will exist between our Naval air arm and other Naval arms if all of them continue to be intimately bound together in one Navy.

- (b) With a separate air corps there is bound to develop a loyalty to the Corps rather than to the Navy, a jealousy between the Corps and the rest of the Navy, many perplexing problems of supply, personnel, administration, and above all a serious loss in effectiveness.
- (c) I know of no advantage to the Navy or the Nation that would accrue from the creation of a Naval Air Corps.

3. MATERIAL

(A) Surface ships.

- (a) I believe new construction is being expedited as much as possible. Minelayers are needed for Atlantic Coast.

(B) Aircraft.

- (a) A tremendous expansion in this field complicated by foreign orders as well as by our demands. Airplanes, either for sale or for training, should not be obtained at the expense of the active Fleet. Fleet planes must be replaced as rapidly as possible, with new planes, but old planes cannot be taken off until new ones are on hand.

(C) Ammunition.

- (a) Build up the maximum reserve possible of anti-aircraft ammunition.

4. OPERATIONS

(A) Retention of the fleet in the Hawaiian Area.

- (a) From a purely Naval point of view there are many disadvantages attached to basing the fleet in this area, some of which are:
 - (1) Difficulty, delay and cost of transporting men, munitions, and supplies.
 - (2) Inadequacy of Lahaina as operating anchorage due to lack of security.
 - (3) Inadequacy of Pearl Harbor as operating anchorage due to difficulties of entry, berthing and departure of large ships.
 - (4) Congested and restricted operating areas, in the air and on the surface.
 - (5) Inadequate facilities for fleet services, training, recreation and housing.
 - (6) Prolonged absences from mainland of officers and men in time of peace adversely affects morale.
 - (7) In case of war, necessary for Fleet to return to mobilization ports on West Coast or accept partial and unorganized mobilization measures resulting in confusion and a net loss of time.

- (b) If the disposition of the Fleet were determined solely by Naval considerations the major portion of the Fleet should return to its normal Pacific Coast bases because such basing would facilitate its training and its preparation for war.
- (c) If factors other than purely Naval ones are to influence the decision as to where the Fleet should be based at this time, the Naval factors should be fully presented and carefully considered, as well as the probable effect of the decision on the readiness of the Fleet. In other words, is it more important to lend strength to diplomatic representations in the Pacific by basing the Fleet in the Hawaiian Area, than to facilitate its preparation for active service in any area by basing the major part of it on normal Pacific Coast bases?
- (d) In case our relations with another Pacific Nation deteriorate, what is the State Department's conception of our next move? Does it believe that the Fleet is now mobilized and that it could embark on a campaign directly from Hawaii or safely conduct necessary training from the insecure anchorage at Lahaina which is 2000 miles nearer enemy submarine bases than our normal Pacific Coast bases?

5. SHORE ESTABLISHMENT

- (a) I hope you will be constantly on guard not to have the position and purpose of the Shore Establishment over-emphasized. It has only one purpose - the support, maintenance and augmentation of the Fighting Fleet. It cannot, of itself, damage an enemy. It is only human that some of those in Washington and long removed from the active Fleet, (predominantly staff corps) frequently fail to visualize the correct priority of objectives.

6. NAVY PUBLICITY

Practically all Navy Publicity, hearings before committees, speeches in Congress and handouts from the Navy Department have stressed one or more of the following ideas:

- (a) The Navy is built for defense.
- (b) A so-called adequate Navy will keep us out of war.
- (c) With an adequate Navy we can impose our will upon the Nations of the earth with little danger of becoming involved in war.
- (d) In the unhappy event of war the Fleet is a kind of mobile Maginot Line behind which the people can reside in peace with no obligation to their Country except to promise that their descendants will some day pay for the Navy.

- (e) The Fleet is fully manned, fully trained and ready to fight at the drop of a hat.
- (f) The comparative strength of navies is measured solely by material things.
- (g) Aviation is a cheap means of defense and that large numbers of planes and pilots will render the nation secure.
- (h) Outlying Naval bases and air fields, in themselves are weapons of defense.

The type of publicity mentioned above is wrong in that it tends to lull the public into a false sense of security. It tends to weaken their moral fibre and to create an unhealthy national morale in a country which may be drawn into war on very short notice. For a people, who may actually be involved in war in a comparatively short time, to be told that they can risk war without danger or wage war without risk, may be fatally detrimental to the determined prosecution of the very war towards which such conceptions inevitably lead. At the beginning of the present war, the French and British had just these ideas, with the present result.

7. COOPERATION BETWEEN EXECUTIVE, STATE, WAR AND NAVY DEPARTMENTS.

(a) Whether justified or not, I can not escape the feeling that the coordination and mutual understanding between the above departments of the government is not as close as is necessary for effective action.

(b) Before reaching a decision as to the disposition and movements of the Fleet, or units thereof, is the Navy Department consulted, are its views frankly and forcibly presented, and are its representations thoroughly understood and considered?

(c) Present policy appears to be headed towards forcing our will upon another Pacific Nation by diplomatic representations supported by economic measures, a large material Navy in process of construction, and the disposition of an inadequately manned Fleet in being. Can this be done and are we prepared to face war or the inevitable loss of prestige if it cannot? Have the objectives of such a war been formulated, and its costs considered and compared with the value of victory? Can such a war be won by defensive measures or by a people trained to believe that the Navy is for defensive purposes only, and that their whole obligation to their country can be met by the payment of taxes.

(d) The Commander-in-Chief has no responsibility for the formulation of National policy, but he has a definite responsibility for the efficiency of one arm upon which the government relies to enforce National policy, when its aims can not be secured by diplomatic means. He must be concerned over the question as to whether the strength and efficiency of the Fleet are commensurate with the aggressive policy of the administration in the Pacific. Especially so if there is a possibility that this policy will require implementation.

(e) Are objectives being formulated and plans made for our active participation in the European war? We cannot long remain half in and half out of such a war. We should decide now on definite objectives and plans and should not assume that we will fight this one like we did the last, i.e., by sending aviation and light forces for active participation and utilizing our heavy ships, in secure home bases, largely as training ships. Such a course would immobilize our heavy ships, which are most certainly going to be needed either in the Atlantic or the Pacific, depending on the progress of the war.

/s/ J. O. Richardson

doc 1500-N-1



No 1

司令長官書類

番号

亞米利加合衆國艦隊

亞米利加合衆國軍艦獲艦「エンタープライズ」号

海軍大臣

一九四〇年九月十二日

海軍大臣、爲、賞書

以下、賞書、士官、就、イテ、知ラント、又、艦、就、イテ、學、バント、艦、隊、戦、争、進、備、投、助、得、ル、方、様、發、見、セ、ト、ス、貴、下、希、望、副、バ、ト、努、力、ニ、吾、人、が、議、論、シ、タ、諸、兵、團、に、提、出、サ、シ、タ、モ、デ、ラ、ル。

人員

一、將校

- (イ) 投擲、昇、進、が、從、來、考、索、サ、レ、タ、最、良、方、法
- (ロ) 來、員、ハ、情、ニ、テ、通、當、ナル、時、ハ、連、續、的、航、海、勤、務、ヲ、計、可、サ、ル、ベ、キ、コ、ト、(議、余、ニ、ヨ、ル、事、又、更、ニ、少、シ、ク、要、ス、ル)
- (ハ) 海、上、勤、務、指、定、ハ、能、力、ヲ、基、礎、ト、ス、ベ、キ、コ、ト、最、モ、有、望、ナル、士、官、優、先、權、ヲ、附、與、サ、ル、ベ、キ、コ、ト、コ、ノ、結、果、將、校、ヲ、最、有、望、及、最、少、等、即、チ、A、表、及、B、表、ノ、二、種、ニ、分、コ、ト、ナ、ラ、ル。
- (ニ) 身、體、的、不、能、因、ル、退、役、濫、用、及、身、體、的、不、通、格、者、現、役、勤、務、持、續、及、退、役、遲、延、ハ、是、正、サ、ル、ベ、キ、コ、ト。

兵員

- (イ) 兵、員、兵、力、ハ、五、月、二、三、日、ヨ、リ、八、月、十、五、日、間、於、チ、一、二、三、四、九、名、ヲ、増、員、サ、レ、タ、太、平、洋、ニ、於、ケ、ル、艦、隊、ハ、達、カ、ニ、六、〇、〇、實、益、ヲ、獲、タ、リ、過、キ、我、が、子、資、材、ニ、對、ス、ル、巨、額、費、用、ハ、迅、速、且、鈞、令、ト、シ、タ、人、員、擴、張、ヲ、シ、テ、限、リ、無、益、ト、ナ、レ、タ、ロ、ウ
- (ロ) 訓、練、所、陸、路、新、兵、受、入、率、ヲ、制、限、ス、ル、カ、ラ、即、刻、除、去、セ、ヌ、バ、ナ、ラ、ヌ、然、レ、テ、緊、急、ニ、擴、張、ハ、不、足、額、補、充、金、ヲ、待、

Defence Doc. 15-00N-1

フコトナリ、大分困難である。吾人ニ悉材、擴張準備ニ際シ、特定ノ經費ヲ待タカニ。何故ニ吾人ハ一層緊要トモイフキ人員ノ問題(既ニ吾人、有スルモノヲ準備スルコト及ニ新構成ニ対シ人員ヲ訓練スルコト、緊急ナル必要ヲ含ム)ニ等シク、直接且有効ナル行動ヲ以テ対処スルコトが出来ヌ。又之ヲ爲サントシナイカ、理由ヲ艦隊ニ諒解セシメ、又ハ説明スルコトハ困難ナリ。余ハ新式軍艦、要員ヲ任ゲル所要期間ヲ四年間ト推算ス。貴下ハ此、訓練ヲ即時開始スル、必要ヲ諒解出来ヨウ。

(二) 分離セル航空部隊

- (1) 若シ總ベテ、海軍部隊カ一作、海軍トシテ密接ニ結果ヲ繼續シテ行クナラバ、我カ海軍航空部隊ト也、海軍部隊ノ間ニハヨリ高度ノ協力が存在スルデモウマ、疑フモノモ、
- (四) 航空部隊ヲ分離シテ置クト、海軍ニ対シテヨリモ、ハシロ部隊ニ心動ヲ勵コラトスル様ナリ。凡運ヤ、部隊ト也、海軍ト、間、嫉妬ヤ、補給、人員、管理ニ関スル面倒ナク、問題、就中、能率上、重大ノ損失が生ズルニキマ、
- (二) 海軍航空部隊ヲ創設スルコトカラ、海軍又ハ國家ニ何、利益モ齎スモノデナイト云、余ハ知ッテル。

三 悉材

(一) 水上艦船

- (1) 新建造ハ出来ルダケ促進サシテナルト余ハ信ヅテル。
- 水雷敷設艦カ大西洋ニ必要ナル。

(二) 航空機

No. 2

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No. 3

(イ) 外國、注文並ニ我が國、需要トニ依ッテ複雑化シタ此、分野ニ於ケル大擴張、販賣用又ハ訓練用航空機ハ、孰レモ現役艦隊、犠牲ニ於テ得ラルベキモノナシ。艦隊機ハ、未ルタケ早ク新機ト取り替ヘラシメバ、ラヌ。然レモ飛行機ハ、新機ヲ入ル迄ハ離スルハ未ヌ。

(二) 彈藥

(A) 防空彈藥トシテ可能ナル最大限、豫備ヲ貯藏セヨ

四 作戰

(イ) (1) フォイ水域ニ艦隊ヲ留メルコト

(イ) 純然タル海軍的見地カラミレバ此、水域ニ艦隊ヲ留メテ、オクコトニハ多クノ不利益ガアルリ、數兵ハ即チ

(一) 人員、軍需品、及ヒ補給品、運搬ニ困難、遲延、及費、用、高ラコト。

(二) 安全度ニ欠陥ガアル為「ラハイナ」ハ作戰投錨地トシテ不適當ナルコト

(三) 大艦、入港、碇泊、出港、困難ガアル為真珠湾ハ作戰投錨地トシテ不適當ナルコト

(四) 空中、水陸共ニ作戰、区域ガ混雜シ且制限サレタルコト

(五) 艦隊勤務、訓練、保養、及ヒ收容等ニ對シ施設不、充分ナルコト

(六) 將校兵員ハ平時ニ本國カラ長ク離レタガ為道德ニ惡影響アルコト

(七) 戦争、際、艦隊ハ西海岸、勤員港ニ戻リ、又ハ部分的

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編制サレテキイ動員措置ヲ受ケル必要ナリ之ハ混
乱ト時間、純損失ヲ招ク結果トナルコト

(四) 若シ艦隊、処理ハ海軍トシテ、考慮ニヨリテ、決定サ
レルナラバ、艦隊、大部分、其ノ太平洋岸、正常基地ニ歸ル
ベキデアル。何トナレバ、其処ヲ根據トスレバ、訓練ニモ不戦争
ニ對スル準備ニモ便宜ナルカラデアル。

(イ) 若シ純然タル海軍的要因以外、要因ハ現在、艦隊
ガ何処ヲ根據地トナスベキカトイフコトニ關スル決定ニ影響
ヲ及ボスモ、デアレバ、海軍的要因壇ニシテ、決定ハ艦隊、
即應準備ニ及ボスコトアルベキ影響ハ悉ク提あげサレ慎重ニ
考慮セラルベキデアル。換言スルハ艦隊、大部分ヲ太平洋
岸、正常基地ニ根據サセテ、如何ナル水域ニ於ケル戦闘ニ對
シテモ準備ガ容易ニ出来ルヤウニスルコトヨリモ「ハワイ」水域
ニ艦隊ヲ根據サセルコトヨリ太平洋ニ於ケル外交障ニ強シ
ヲ予ヘヤウトスルコト、方ハ一層大切ナノデアラウカ。

(三) 若シ太平洋岸、他ノ國家ト我ノ國ト、關係ガ惡化スレバ、
國務省ハ我々、次、動キ、何デアルト考ヘルカ。
國務省ハ艦隊ガ直ニ動員サレ且艦隊ハ「ハワイ」直接
ニ戦闘ヲ開始シ得ルカ或ハ我々、太平洋岸、正常基地ヨリ
モ敵、潛水艇基地ニ二千哩止イ「ハワイ」ニ於ケル不安全
ナ錨地カラ必要ヲ訓練ヲ安全ニ行フコトハ出来ルト信ズ
ル「ハワイ」カ。

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五 海岸施設

- (イ) 余、海岸施設、此地位、或曰目的、餘、強調、過、デ、ト、ノ、様
貴下が所へ又、警告、セ、シ、テ、ヲ、布、告、ス、ル。ソレ、ハ、唯、一、ノ、目的、ヲ、有、シ、居
ル、過、デ、ナ、イ、即チ、戦、闘、艦、隊、之、支、援、維、持、及、擴、充、デ、ル、其、其、
自身、カ、チ、敵、ヲ、破、碎、出、来、ル、モ、デ、ナ、イ、ワ、シ、ト、シ、ニ、居、現、役、艦、隊
(特ニ、參、謀、部、隊、カ、ラ、ズ、ト、以、前、離、ノ、人、々、ガ、憂、目、的、物、何、ノ、先
ニ、デ、カ、ラ、認、識、シ、損、ハ、全、ク、人、間、ト、シ、テ、致、方、イ、コ、ト、デ、ル。

六 海軍、公表

實際、所、以、テ、海、軍、公、表、即チ、委、員、會、ニ、於、テ、ル、審、議、議、會
於、テ、ル、演、說、及、海、軍、省、カ、ラ、發、表、文、書、ハ、次、ノ、觀、念、中、ニ、或、
シ、以、上、ヲ、強、調、シ、テ、来、テ、居、ル。

- (イ) 海軍、防、禦、ヲ、爲、シ、設、ケ、ラ、レ、ト、シ、キ、ル。

- (ロ) 所謂、此、ノ、海、軍、我、々、ガ、戰、争、ヲ、シ、テ、一、濟、福、ニ、ス、ル、モ、デ、ナ、イ、ル。

- (ハ) 亦、テ、海、軍、在、リ、バ、我、々、ガ、戰、争、ニ、捲、キ、込、レ、ル、危、險、餘、無、シ、
地球、上、ノ、國、家、我、々、ノ、長、ミ、テ、抑、シ、ラ、レ、ト、ガ、出、来、ル。

- (ニ) 不幸、ニ、シ、テ、戰、争、ガ、起、リ、バ、艦、隊、一、種、可、動、性、アル、コ、ト、一、線、
様、ヲ、モ、デ、シ、後、方、ニ、於、テ、國、民、ノ、自、身、等、ノ、子、孫、ガ、他、日、海、軍、ニ
シ、テ、補、償、ヲ、モ、ル、ト、イ、フ、約、束、ヲ、ス、ル、ダ、ケ、デ、シ、外、國、亦、シ、テ、何、等、
ノ、義、務、モ、シ、テ、其、後、ニ、暮、ス、ト、ガ、出、来、ル。

- (ホ) 艦、隊、ノ、完、全、ニ、充、員、シ、充、分、訓、練、サ、シ、即、座、ニ、戰、用、意、ガ、出、来、
テ、居、ル。

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- (ヘ) 海、軍、ノ、比、較、的、ノ、度、方、ノ、唯、全、ク、物、質、的、ノ、物、ニ、依、リ、計、ラ、レ、ル

- (ト) 航空、ノ、安、價、ノ、防、禦、手、段、ニ、テ、リ、又、多、數、ノ、飛、行、機、ト、操、縱、シ、テ、

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國家ヲ安全ナラシムル

(4) 遠隔、海軍基地及飛行場、ソレ自身防禦武器等

前記、宣傳様式、國民ヲミテ誤ニ安全感ニ陷ル恐れアルヲ以テ、間違ニナル、ソレハ非常ニ短キ予告ヲ戰爭ニ引キ入ラシルカモ知ラズ、國於テ國民、精神的、事實ヲ弱クシ不健全ナ國民主義ヲ作り出シ、易イ比較的短時間ニ實際ニ戰爭ニ捲キ込ミラカモ知ラズ、國民ニ取テ、危險ナリテ戰爭ヲ賭スニトガ出来ルトカ危險ヲ冒スニトテ、戰爭ヲ行フトガ出来ルト教ニシテトハ斯ル概念が必然的ニ導ス、戰爭、突然ニ遂行ニ致命的被害ヲ及ボスヤ、現戰爭、初メ佛蘭西人及英國人、丁度コソ考ヘ持テ居タリシテ現在、如キ結果ヲ来クシテ居ル

行政、國務、陸軍、海軍、各省間、協力

- (1) 正當ナル在ヤ、別トシ、私名、政府、各省間、其働ト相互了解、政策的活動ニ必要ト程、必要ニ密接ニイテ、極ニ感ジシヲラシ、
- (2) 艦隊若ハ、部隊、配置及行動ニ関スル決定ニ至ル前、海軍省が相談ヲ受ケ、ソレ意見が平直ニ力強く表明サレタリ、主張が充分了解サレ考慮サレタリ、
- (3) 現在政策、経済的手段建設、實質的、大、海軍、及之、員不充分、現存艦隊、配置ニ依リ支拂サレ外交的、意、表示、依、我、意、志、地、太平洋國家ニ強キトスル方向ニ向キ、居ル、係、見、受、シ、ル、之、為、得、ル、ニ、リ、吾、々、若、シ、成、功、セ、バ、場、合、於、テ、戰爭、若、ハ、必然的、威信、失墜、直、面、ス、ル、用意、カ、ハ、カ、斯、ル、戰爭、目的、が、公、式、化、サ、テ、居、ル、カ、ハ、犧牲、考慮、サ、テ、居